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Theme v. Reality in American Legal History:
A Commentary on Horwitz, The Transformation of
American Law, 1780-1860, and on the Common Law
in America
R. RANDALL BRIDWELL*
While the events of the past are the source of the experience of the
human race, their opinions are determined not be the objective facts but by
the records and interpretations to which they have access. Few men will deny
that our views about the goodness or badness of different institutions are
largely determined by what we believe to have been their effects in the past.
There is scarcely a political ideal or concept which does not involve opinions
about a whole series of past events, and there are few historical memories
which do not serve as a symbol of some political aim. Yet the historical
beliefs which guide us in the present are not always in accord with the facts;
sometimes they are even the effects rather than the cause of political beliefs.
F. A. Hayek**
INTRODUCTION
Morton Horwitz's The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860x is a

serious and thoughtful attempt to describe some of the basic, general themes
in American law during one of its most energetic and creative periods. Professor Horwitz assembles a vast body of data consisting principally of judicial
opinions and doctrinal writing, but which also extends to economic, social
and political history. He attempts to extrapolate from this data the common
Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. Portions of this article
were based upon a recently published treatise, R. BRIDWELL AND R. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUION
AND THE COMMON LAW. THE DECLINE OF THE DOCTRINES
FEDERALISM, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co. (1977).
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The author wishes to express his
thanks to D.C. Heath and Co. for permitting the use of some of the material herein, as well as to
Professor Ralph U. Whitten, who developed many of the ideas herein with the author. Thanks
are also due to Professor Maurice Holland of Indiana University School of Law, who read the
manuscript of this article and offered many valuable suggestions. For a more complete treatment
of the subjects discussed here, the treatise should be consulted.
**F. HAYEK. CAPITALISM AND THE HISTORIANS at 3-4 (1954).
'Harvard University Press (1971) [hereinafter cited as HoRwrrz]. For some recent reviews
of Horwitz's book, see Gilmore, Book Review, 86 YALE L.J. -788 (1977); Kettner, Book Review, 8
J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 390 (1977); Genovese, Book Review, 91 HARv. L. REV. 776 (1978);
Wroth, Book Review, 28 HARv. LAW SCHOOL BULLETIN at 30 (1977); Foner, Book Review, THE

NEW YORK REvIEw OF BoOKS (1977); Reid, Book Review, 55 TEx. L. REv. 1307 (1977); Hurst,
Book Review, 21 Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 175 (1977); Winship, Book Review, 31 SotiHWESTERN L.J.
751 (977). The best review to appear thus far is Presser, Book Review, 52 N.Y.U. LAW. REv. 100
(1977).
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threads and general patterns which can give the reader genuinely fundamental insights into our legal process, indeed into the nature of the process by
which common law is generated, or as some say "created" and applied by the
judiciary. 2 In his description of precise causes for the emergence of much
nineteenth century doctrine, Professor Horwitz's work is much more thematic
than similar recent attempts to present comprehensive insights into our legal
history,3 and much more reliant on his own interpretations of original sources
of a general nature. He also extends his inquiry beyond the more regional or
localized works, though many of the essentially local studies certainly have
broader, national implications. 4 Thus, in the breadth of both the raw
material analysed and the ambition of the monograph to expand upon the
narrower doctrinal treatment of its parts, Professor Horwitz should be commended." However, neither the ambitious scope of such a work, nor the
laudibile intent of its author to raise the level of his inquiry above that of our
previous historical pioneers who sought to reveal the substance and general
character rather than the often confusing particulars of our legal past, 6 are
the final measure of success. For, though Professor Horwitz has attempted to
prove much, what he has actually proved may be summarized with rather
startling brevity. Relatedly, the points upon which his proof and analysis can
with all charity he said to have failed utterly are rather numerous. 7 Moreover,
among his numerous errors one may readily see one central mistake more
fundamental than the others, indeed one which in all probability produced
the others. This recurrent problem concerns the method by which Professor
Horwitz seeks to demonstrate the major themes of his book-his most essential proof is clumsily lifted completely out of its context so that its significance
2More than anything else Horwitz seeks to illuminate the common law process as an instrument for legal change "[s]ince few historians have . . . thought through the problems of using
this concept in a comment law context." HORwrrz, supra note 1 at XV. Indeed, emphasis on the
'judicial role is the keynote of Horwitz's whole analysis. It is precisely this facet of his study that is
the weakest. The ingenious way in which Horwitz distorts the common law process is of primary
interest to anyone who wished to thoroughly understand this book and appraise its worth.
3See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW(1973). Professor Friedman relied mainly
on secondary materials for his work, and his presentation of the major themes in American legal
history is more various and diverse than Horwitz's focused economic interpretations.
4
See W. NELSON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW (1975).
5
See Holt, Now and Then: The Uncertain State of Nineteenth Century American Legal
History, 7 IND. L. REV. 615, 626 (1974), where Holt quotes Horwitz's dissatisfaction with too much

"detail" in the writing of American legal history, to the neglect of "broader interpretative
themes." Indeed Horwitz in his new book allows that "This study attempts to challenge certain
features of 'concensus history that has continued to dominate American historiography since the
Second World War." HORWITZ. supra note 1, at xiii. In producing much of this history, "Even
sophisticated lawyers, who regularly address themselves to the policies imbedded in contemporary
legal rules, tried to treat the historical study of law with an arid formalism that is striking and
surprising." Id. at xi - xii, A distaste for the particulars of legal rules, and their technicalities
forms a large part of the new preference for thematic "intellectual" history.
eFor example, see R. POUND, THE FORMATIvE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1950) for an attempt
to synthesize and explain a great mass of doctrinal detail.
'This point is developed further in later parts of this article. See notes 21-124 infra & text
accompanying.
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is invariably distorted and its meaning thoroughly changed. 8 In this respect
alone, Professor Horwitz's book exemplifies the increasing prevalent condition
of American legal historical scholarship more vividly than any book in
decades. Even more importantly the apparent reason for this spirit of even
handed distortion is an erroneous conception of the common law process,
particularly the English common law system. Horwitz's misconstruction of the
common law system is a product of his failure to treat any of the major legal
issues analysed in their broader historical context. More than any other factor, this causes Professor Horwitz to conceive of each chosen piece of legal
datum as evidence of a novel or revolutionary change in the legal system.
Thus a great amount of evidence which appears quite conventional in context
is by extraction and narrow presentation made to fit into his "transformation"
motif.

More than anything else, Horwitz's book purports to be about the common law process. This is of course one of the most debated themes in
American legal history, and one with much relevance to current issues of
judicial authority and discretion. Much has been said and written about the
powers which judges have traditionally enjoyed in our legal system and their
capacity to discretionarily employ their authority to apply, or perhaps also
provide, binding rules aimed at serving particular social or economic purposes, as well as the appropriate sources of the legal rules so applied.9
Naturally what the judges did in the past is highly relevant to the analysis of
the broader issue of the current status of the common Law. Ironically, it is in
describing the concept and practice of common law adjudication in our early
national period that Horwitz's new book fails the most. It will therefore be
useful to analyze particular examples of Horwitz's method of proof, and to
discuss at some length the operation of this common law system in certain
areas critical to his proof in order to illustrate the broader context and the
aThough almost any attempt to isolate legal or Constitutonal phenonamena rends the
"seamless webb" of history and to some degree inevitably distorts the truth.
However, there is a vast difference in the distortion caused by the interjection of the
observer and his inevitable selectivity and focus upon particular data, and the overly narrow partial representation of a phenomena such as the common law process, resulting in a mistatement
of its content. It is the latter, more serious, flaw which charactrizes; Horwitz's book.
'Professor Horwitz's current book is in large measure an attempt to expand upon and provide further proof for the thesis of his earlier writing in article form, as his introduction indicates. See Horwitz, The Emergence of an instrumental Conception of American Law 1780-1820
in V. PERspEctivEs iN AMICAN HISTORY 287 (1971); Horwitz, The Transformation fn the Conception of Property 1780-1860, 40 U. C. L. REv. 248 (1973); Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 Am. J. LEGAL HisT. 251 (1976). As Professor Nelson aptly observed
"The key point, however, is that legal rules and traditions do service beyond the period
of their immediate usefulness to dominate groups, and in doing so, take on a status
that is autonomous to the immediate political interests of those groups. This semiautomonous body of law, which can and does serve as a restraint on decision makers,
surely is a legitimate object of historical study." Nelson, Legal History-Annual Survey
of American Law, 1973-74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 625, 640. See BURGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JuDICARY (1977).
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operational rules and principles of decision-making which his artificial selectivity has managed to obscure. If as Professor Nelson claims this is "one of
the five most significant books ever published in the field of American legal
History,"' 0 the book and the developments it analyses certainly deserve this
extended treatment. The process by which this demonstrable distortion has
been produced can than be placed in the context of broader tends in the
writing of legal history, and some observations can be made on a much
debated subject: the efficient relationship between legal and historical training and methods of investigation and analysis." This may be accomplished by
considering the following: (a) a description of what Professor Horwitz attempts to prove, that is, his central theme; (b) the methods he employs in attempting this proof and the particular errors associated with several elements
of it; and (c) a description of certain of the broader subject matter areas
critical to Horwitz's analysis of the common law process and to his basic
theme, including a more thorough description of the common law precess
itself in the context of two extremely important elements in Horwitz's
thesis-the general commercial law and the conflict of laws. Also thoroughly
analyzed and evaluated will be one of William Crosskey's controversial themes
as it applies to the common law process in the federal courts, 12 and Horwitz's
10"The comment is attributed to William A. Nelson, Yale University." S. Bremer, Book
Review, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 700, 716 n.52 (1977).
"As Frederick Maitland remarked, though lawyers seldom seem to make good historians
and the lawyers method often conflicts with historical objectivity, legal training is nonetheless important in doing good legal historical work. "But we can say this, that a thorough training in
modem law is almost indispensable for anyone who wishes to do good work on legal history."
Maitland, Why the History of England Law Was Not Written, in FREDRICK WILLIAM MAITLAND.
HISTORIAN 132, 140 (R. Schuyler ed. 1960). Horwitz has elsewhere observed that a reasoning pro-

cess common to the lawyer's technique, has produced a "conservative tradition in the writing of
our legal history." In comparing the effect of legal reasoning process upon historical objectivity,
Horwitz draws a comparison to the writing of scientific history, in which " 'earlier ages are implicitly represented as having worked upon the same set of fixed problems and in accordance
with the same set of fixed cannons that the most recent revolution in scientific method has made
seem scientific." Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History,
17 AM.

J.

LEGAL HIsT. 275 (1973), quoting, T. KUHN,THE STRUCTURES

OF

SCIENTIFIC REvoLu.

TIONS at 137-38 (2d ed. 1970). In other words, the lawyer's attempt to synthesize a current
postulate or principle from past data, which may represent disorder and conflict rather than a
continuum, results in a distortion of the acutal past condition analyzed. Amazingly enough, some
recent writers have regarded the recognition of "ideological conservatism" in the writing of legal

history as a path-breaking insight. See Auerback, Book Review, 85 YALE L.J. 855 (1976). This
particular observation is, however, one of the older recognized historiographic themes. See W.
HOLDSwORTH, THE

HISTORIAN OF ANGLO AMERICAN LAW 138-41 (1928); C. FIFOOT, LAW AND
HISTORY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 8, 14-15 (1956). In evaluating Professor Horwitz's books,

we shall isolate and discuss the relationship between legal methods of investigation and analysis of
data.
isThe reference is, of course, to W. CROSSKEY. POLITICS AND THE

CONSTITUTION

IN THE

(1955). For a detailed discussion of parts of Professor Crosskey's
work particularly his interpretation of the development of conflict of laws and commercial law
rules in the federal courts. See note 56 supra & text accompanying. For an excellent account of
the "reception" of the controversy generated by Crosskey's famous work, see Wollan, Crosskey's
Once and Future Constituion, 6 POLITICAL Sci. REVIEWER 129 (1975). One objective here is to
supply some much needed data and analysis relevant to these excerpts of Crosskey's work, as they
have not been forthcoming since its publication nearly twenty-five years ago.
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
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treatment of it. Our objective will then be to briefly illustrate and critique
Horwitz's theory and methodology in a selective fashion, and to test his
theories against the broader and more fully developed background of a major
subject matter area. The conclusion will emphasize the thematic and subjective characteristics of much of our modem legal literature, and hopefully provide some sound insights into the relevance of the lawyer's craft to the
analysis of legal historical data. Not only may the worth of Horwitz's book and
its contribution to our understanding be thereby better appraised; but also
what this and numerous other articles purport to describe-the role of the
judge in the American system-may be better understood.
BASIC THEMES

The central themes of Horwitz's monograph may be stated briefly. During the years in question, 1780-1860, a wholly novel theory emerged in
American law, and appeared in judicial decisions in the area of private law.
This new "conception" of American law resulted from the collapse of the
older theory of the common law as a body of just principles autonomous from
human institutions, but discernable by the application of human reason.13 In
its place emerged a theory of law, including common law, which identified
legal rules wholly with human will, thus coming full circle from the old view.
As Horwitz puts it, "The result of this transformation in the underlying basis
for legitimacy of the common law was that jurists began to conceive of the
common law as an instrument of will."' 14 This dramatic shift in legal theory

also led to an equally dramatic shift in the judges' conception of their own
role and their ultimate objectives in the common law process. "As judges
began to conceive of common adjudication as a process of making and not
merely discovering legal rules, they were led to frame general doctrines based
on a self conscious consideration of social and economic policies." 5 The shift
from the supposed "discovery" of legal rules to rational and "self conscious articulation" of them heightened the judicial awareness that what was being
13The characterization which Horwitz places upon the old or eighteenth century conception
of the common law is entirely incomplete and misleading. Characteristically, he confines his
discussion of this complex phenomenon to certain parts only, and contrasts the supposed change
in legal theory to the single narrow facet of the common law process which he has chosen to
represent it. A whole or more sophisticated explanation of the common law process, as it was
conceived in the eighteenth century, will render all of Horwitz's evidence of novelty and change
quite conventional. The recurrent practice of taking evidence out of context-such as the narrow
view of the common law-which Horwitz uses to create the appearance of change whenever other
data is compared to the extracted artificially limited evidence of the common law thus accelerates
and distorts the observer's sense of movement away from old doctrine.
14Hoawrrz, supra note 1, at 22.
"5Id. at 2, appearing in a chapter entitled "The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception
of American Law," which is the name Horwitz gives to this new judicial rulemaking power.
Likewise Horwitz asserts, "What dramatically distinguished nineteenth century law from its eighteenth century counterpart was the extent to which common law judges came to play a central
role in directing the course of social change." Id. at 1.
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done was the making and enforcement of far ranging social policy. "For the
first time, lawyers and judges can be found with some regularity to reason
about the social consequences of particular legal rules."1 6 Similarly, jurists
began to frame legal arguments in terms of "the importance of the present
decision to the commercial character of our country.""7 Thus, not only did a
large number of new legal rules, new precedent, emerge during this period,
but both the way in which the rules were created and their purpose were also
novel. These features and their effect on the judicial role in our common law
processes are central to Horwitz's work. 1 8
Equally important, however, is the result of this jurisprudential change,
for as it concentrated far ranging power in the courts, Horwitz argues, the
precise conception of the social and economic policies resulting from the new
power also became clear. The new direction pursued by the judiciary armed
with their novel and instrumental theory of law was to support dominant,
growing capital and economic forces, that is "big business" and the commercial classes, by restructuring the private law in.order to create an extensive
system of legal subsidies. As Horwitz contends "Having destroyed or neutralized earlier protective or regulatory doctrines at the same time as they limited
power of juries to mete out the rough and discretionary standards of commercial justice, a newly established procommercial elite was able to align itself
with aggressive business interests." 1 9 Thus, "[I]n the period between 1790 and
1820 we see the development of an important new set of relationships that
make this position of dominance [of commercial interests] possible: the forging of an alliance between legal and commercial interests."20 The judiciary,
16

Id. at 2.
"Id. (quoting Liebert v. The Emperor, Bee's Admir. Rep. 339, 343 (Pa. 1785)).

1SSee note 2 supra.

"9HoRwrrz. supra note 1, at 211.

201d. at 140 (emphasis added). The results of the alliance and the emerging system of
private law subsidy rules, Horwitz alleges, did no good for the economically weaker elements of
society. "It does seem quite likely that they did contribute to an increase in inequality by throwing a disproportionate share of the burdens of economic growth on the weakest and least organized
group in American society." Id. at 101.

For seventy or eighty years after the American Revolution of major direction of
common law policy reflected the overthrow of eighteenth century precommercial and
antidevelopmental values. As political and economic power shifted to merchant and

entreprenurial groups in the postrevolutionary period, they began to forge an alliance
with the legal profession to advance their own interests through a transformation of
the legal system.
Law, once conceived of as protective, regulative, paternalistic and, above all, a
paramount expression of the moral sense of the community, had come to be thought
of as facilitative of individual desires and as simply reflective of the existing organization of economic and political power.
By the middle of the nineteenth century the legal system had been reshaped to
the advantage of men of commerce and industry at the expense of farmers, workers,
consumers, and other less powerful groups within the society. Not only had the law
come to establish legal doctrines that maintained the new distribution of economic and
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then, employed a new conception of their common law authority to shake off
the restraints of earlier common law substantive principles, and in so doing
conspired with the business world to redistribute society's resources in a manner favorable to the commercial elite. 21 The thesis is straightforward enough,
but the proof of these claims must be tested. That requires a discussion of the
data used by Horwitz to support this transformation theme and the method
of its presentation.
In discussing the law lectures of James Wilson delivered in Philadelpia in
the 1790's, Horwitz remarks: "Wilson revealed the extent to which he had
come under the spell of modem [sic] conception of law as a sovereign command." 22 In the passage Horwitz quotes from Wilson, a hypothotical dispute
is put by Wilson as an illustration of the principle legitimizing positive rules
of law. Wilson denies the asserted duty to obey a particular principle simply
because it may arguably be moral to do so, because such an "injunction",
without more "possessed no human authority." 23 Horwitz concludes,
"Thus the bases for obedience to law was set entirely within the modem
framework of a will theory of law . ..This definition of the basis of obligation in terms of popular will was a far cry from the eighteenth century conception of obligation derived from the inherent rightness or justice of law.
The result was distinctly postrevolutionary phenomenon: an attempt to
reconstruct the legitimacy not simply of statues, but of common law rules, on
a consensual foundation. Wilson, for example, insisted that custom was in4
trinsic evidence of consent."
Indeed, as Wilson put it, in the continuance of customary rules revealed
"the operations of consent universally predominant."2 6 "Thus," says Horwitz,
political power, but, wherever it could, it actively promoted a legal redistribution of
wealth against the weakest groups in society.
Id. at 253-54.
At one point Horwitz allows that this massive overhaul in the private law may have come
"only by inadvertance" thus avoiding a flat statement of a conscious "conspiracy theory" involving
lawyers, judges and businessmen. The degree of consciousness is, however, irrelevant to whether
the doctrinal changes actually took place outside conventional common law theories and according to a new conception of law.
Even if Horwitz's theory of a rather unified class oriented activism in the early American
judiciary is accepted, the economic interpretations which he makes of the case law are very questionable. See R. POSNER, EcONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 183-85 (2d ed. 1977), discussing Horwitz's
economic interpretations of certain features of nineteenth century contract law in Horwitz, The
HistoricalFoundationsof Modem Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REy. 917 (1974). Full consideration of Horwitz's economic analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
21
See HoRwrrz. surpa note 1, at xvi, citing R.H. Coase's famous theorem on the effect of
legal rules on efficiency. Though it is debatable whether efficiency is affected by altering the
legal rules without "transaction costs, distribution of resources is an entirely different matter.
2
2HoRwrrz, supra note 1, at 19.
13
1d., citing 1 TH-E WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 180 (R. McCLoskey ed. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as4 WILSON]. See WILSON at 112-14.
2 HoRwrrz,supra note 1, at 19. See WILSON at 122.
25

1d.
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"Wilson had significantly concluded that the obligatory force of the common
26
law rested on nothing else but free and voluntary consent."
What, precisely, is the old view with which Wilson's remarks are contrasted? According to Horwitz, it is "the inherent rightness or justice" of a
particular rule, which is very different from consent. In understanding Horwitz's method, several things must be noted. For one thing, this characterization is an artificial and misleading characterization of the old view of law,
albeit a characterization absolutely indispensable to Horwitz's claim of novelty
and ultimately to the transformation theme of the book. Even more importantly, however, the contention that purely consensual explanations of the
common law were in Wilson's time new is simply an error.28 In fact, "natural
law" or "law of reason" justifications for common law rules and consensual
explanations of their origins were both a part of the common law tradition
long before the American Revolution. 29 Horwitz's vision of a "law of nature"
26HoRwrTz. supra note 1, at 19. See WILSON at 184-85.
5

2 HoRwIrz. supra note 1, at 19.
28A thorough description of the different views of the precise relationship between natural
theory and the positive law, particularly customary law, is beyond the scope of this work. It is
enough for our purposes to note the conjunctive use of natural law and consensual explanations
for the obligatory force of legal rules. Horwitz ignores this highly important fact by presenting
the older theory of legal obligation in terms of a completely unexplained reference to the
"discovery" principle of common law adjudication. As Professor Christie has observed "The ability of the natural-law tradition to attract sustained widespread intellectual interest in modem
times has not been helped by the tendency of supporters and detractors of the tradition to carry
on their debate by means of cliches." G. CHRISTIE. JURISPRUDENCE 78 (1973). Moreover, as he

remarked, "[T]here really is no such thing as a coherent natural law tradition with a common
core of specific intellectual and moral concerns but only a constant groping by many diverse
thinkers for the essence of law." Id. The important point to remember, however, is that the
structure of the analysis of natural law has not been along the mutually exclusive lines of consent
and "discovery" of disembodied devine principles, but has integrated the latter theoretical explanation for the 'essence of law" with consensual forms of positive rulemaking, which
characteristically include custom or common law. See C. ST. GERMAIN. DOCTOR AND STUDENT OR
DIALOGUES BETWEEN A DOCTOR OF DIVINTY AND A STUDENT OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

14 (16th ed.

1761) [hereinafter cited as GERMAIN]; F. POLLOCK. ESSAYS INTHE LAW. 179 (1922).
Much of the influential writing on the subject also recognized the compatability of the process of exercising human will to create positive law with essentially "devine" and natural principles of a supposedly immountable and universal character. SEe T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA
SECUNDA PAR, Q 90. Arts I and 11 (1273-76), from Dominican Province Translation (London,
1915). As Aaninas remarked upon the related or compatible exercise of human will and the
devine standards that governed and validated the exercise, "[T]his participation in the external
law in the rational creature is called natural law." Id. at Q 91, Art. III. "Therefore all laws insofar as they partake of right reason, are derived from the external law." Id. Q 93, art. III.
"Natural reason" was regarded as a "general condition" to which positive laws must conform,
though each mainfestation of reason in the form of positive laws entails different positive principles among different people or different places. See id. Q. 91, art IV. But most importantly
"the consent of the whole people expressed by a custom" was a well understood function of the
natural law. Id., Q. 97, Art III. We will later herein more thoroughly consider the manifestations of this particular aspect of natural law theory in the case law. At any rate, regardless of the
particular espistomological problems with the theory, its compatability with positive customary
rules of law of a recognized consensual nature was perfectly evident in the classical philosophy
and judicial exigesis of the natural law system.
29j. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 32 (1957); F. POLLOCK,
ESSAYS IN THE LAW

64 (1922).
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rationale yielding to the consensual one is grossly overstated, for both
elements had long been regarded as essential to a complete description of the
common law process. Moreover, even if one accepted Horwitz' view, it is not
clear why the alleged emphasis on consent would cause the judiciary to
emerge as the most significant and powerful element in the legal system. Such
a persuasive preoccupation with consent would rather seem to be an invitation to legislate, and perhaps tend to reduce rather than encourage the extensive judicial activity which Horwitz points to in support of his thesis. If such a
new conception were really widely or deeply held, one would expect more
than a passing remark from the judiciary in defense of the massive doctrinal
overhaul which they were producing.
METHOD OF PROOF: FLAWS IN EVIDENCE

It is clear that Horwitz's proof for the existence of the new "instrumental"
theory of law, and the procommercial results it was consciously used to produce, rests mainly upon the demonstration that nineteenth century judicial
action was itself novel in character. In the styles of decisionmaking which
typified it, and in the effects it was capable of producing, this judicial action
is described by Horwitz as being thoroughly novel. This is of course indispensable to the argument that a new theory of judicial action, a new conception,
was born; for unless Horwitz can successfully argue that this era represented a
new jurisprudence, his primary contribution would simply be the identification of doctrinal changes which had some impact on the distribution of
societies resources. It is thus critical for Horwitz to show that the way is which
rules of common law were changed was novel, and not just that some novel
rules emerged.
One of the first and most important indicators of the evidence of an instrumental conception concerns the manner in which the older common law
authority was, according to Horwitz, harmonized by the courts with an
allegedly modem theory-the "will theory" of law. Two facets of the argument which provide evidence of this new rationalization are critical to Horwitz's argument: (1) the characterization of the old concept of common law
authority-(i.e. what legitimized common law rules), and (2) the identification of a new explanation in contrast with the old. In the treatment of these
elements, illustrating a process of proof that is quite literally pathological to
Horwitz's work, the data representing the old view is narrowed and completely removed from context-and in some cases left entirely unexplained-so
that the evidence tendered as representing the new view will assume an exaggerated contrast when compared with the old, thus appearing strikingly
distinct. The important point, however, is the fact that abundant evidence
from the English common law system demonstrates a pre-eighteenth century
awareness of both the consensual rational for common law authority and the
utility of judicially fashioned rules-two elements which Horwitz defines as
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"distinctly postrevolutionary."" (For example, in the Case of Tanistry, decided by the King's Bench in 1608 all the trappings of the instrumental conception of law are apparent.) The question there was whether a customary rule
of Irish law-the tenure of tanistry-or the English common law rule of
primogeniture should prevail. 3 ' Both the source of legal obligation in the common law system and the utility of these competing rules were discussed by the
court. As the reporter described the principles relating to the common law:
"[A] custom, in the intendment of law, is such an usage as hath obtained the
force of a law, and is in truth a binding law to such particular place, persons
or things as it concerns; and such custom cannot be established by the king's
grant... nor by act of parliament, but is lex non scripta,
and made by the
3
people only of such place, where the custom runs."
Is the phrase "made by the people" suggestive of some consensual explanation of the common law process, or merely the jargon of the old
"discovery" theory of the common law?'3 The case places the source of common law obligation within a voluntary or consensual process. As the case continues: "For where the people find any act to be good and beneficial, and apt
and agreeable to their nature and disposition, they use and practice it from
time to time . . .,,, Further underscoring the conceptual justifications
thought to apply to common law rules, the court disallowed the alleged
custom of tanistry, and illuminated the relationship between the determination of reasonableness and consent itself by characterizing such allegedly binding customary rules as "prejudicial to a multitude of subjects or to the common wealth in general, and commenced by wrong and oppression, and not
be voluntary consent of the people..." and as such "they are adjudged
unreasonable."'"
3"HoRwrrz,supra note 1, at 19.
"See 80 Eng. Rep. 516 (1608). Under the Irish custom, property descended to "oldest and
most worthy man of the blood and surname."
"280 Eng. Rep. 519 (1608).
33HoRwrrz, supra note 1, at 248 referring to "common law rules, which were thought to be
discovered from 'immutable principles of natural law and abstract justice.'
'88 Eng. Rep. 520 (1608).
3588 Eng. Rep. 520-21 (1608). The court elsewhere sets up a distinction between a custom
and "positive law," stating that "chescun custome nest unreasonable give est contrarie at particular rule ou maxine del positive ley," and also between these two elements and the "law of
reason." As to a custom contrary to the public good or somehow injurious to the multitude and
favoring only some particular person, "tiel custome est repugnant al ley de reason, gives est
desuis touts positive leyes," that is, repugnant to the law of reason which transcends even positive
laws. 80 Ens. Rep. 520 (1608). Under this heirarchy of legitimizing principles a custom may
prevail, if not "unreasonable," or against a "positive law" but neither avail if contrary to the law
of reason. This will be discussed in § C, infra in the description of the common law process. The
most important point is that all were viewed as compatible with consent, and consensual explanations were ordinarily given conjuctively with the others. It is necessary to delay full discussion of
the common law process and its legitimizing principles until the later section, because it is too
complex and important to allow piecemeal examination.
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Thus, autonomous and regular party behavior could be observed by the
courts under standards principally involving general acceptance, continuity
and certainty, and could become a governing rule of decision. The consensual explanation as the overriding source of legitimacy of the rule was a
familiar element in the language of the common law, and was employed in a
manner compatible with what Horwitz describes as a separate and exclusive
"natural justice" or discovery" rationale.3 6 Indeed, consent was employed in a
manner which demonstrated its essential relationship to the transcendent re37
quirement of "reasonableness."
56

HoRwrrz, supra notre at 19.
7Moreover, the classical debate about the natural law from the middle ages onward embraced consensual explanations for customary law. As St. Thomas Aquinas observed in Summa
Theologia of 1273-76, "[T]he consent of the whole people expressed by a custom counts far more
in favour of a particular observance, than does the authority of the sovereign, who has not the
power to frame laws, except as representing the people." T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, SEUCNDA PARS, 0. 97, Art. III (1273-76) from the Dominican Province Translation (London 1915). Indeed the language of "reason," "reasonableness" or "natural law" was merely a theoretical
justification of the processes of the common law. Rather than signifying some detached process of
discretionary selection among certain disembodies natural rules, such language was the companion of the "consensual" description and theory behind the process of evolving rules of decision.
As Matthew Hale, writing in 1671, remarked of the common law:
[T]here is great reason for it; for it is not only a very just and excellent liw in
itself, but it is singularly accommodated to the frames of English Government, and to
the disposition of the English nation, and such as by long experience and use is as it
were incorporated into their very temperanment, and, as a manner, became the complection and constitution of the English Commonwealth.
THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw OF ENGLAND 30 (C. Gray ed. 1973).
Thus, the language of consent was one of the most familiar elements in both municipal law
and private international law in the eighteenth century, and during earlier periods. As
Christopher St. Germain pointed out in describing the elements of the common law within
English jurisprudence of the early sixteenth century, customs were observable facts, to be "determined by the justices," which derived their authority from their acceptance "by our lord the
king, and his progenitors and all his subjects." GERMAIN supra note 28, at 19. As Horwitz
remarked in his attempts to describe the supposed novelty of Wilson's views, "however much
Wilson argued over whose will ultimately legitimized legal commands," a description of the principles of legitimation in terms of consent was "entirely modem." HoRwrrz. surpa note 1, at 19. It
was not, and however much one debates such procedures for identifying consent, the theoretical
and consensual justification for the rules themselves may have been modem for Christopher St.
Germain, writing in 1523 but a 250 year discrepancy in Horwitz case for novelty is hardly insignificant!
Other evidence of the older consensual view abounds in the literature of the Engligh common law, and was largely adopted with the rationale for the common law system in America. For
example, in the introductory remarks to his report of cases from the King's Bench from
1601-1621, Sir William Davies remarked on the principles from which the rules of the common
law-indeed the common law process-derived legitimacy and obligatory force.
Therefore as the law of nature, which the Schoolman calls jus commun and
which is alsojus non scriptum, being written only in the heart of man, is better than
all the written hours on the world to make man honest and happy in this life, if they
would observe the rules therof: so the customary law of England, which we do' believe
calljus commun, as coming nearest to the law of nature ... and which is also jus non
Scriptum.
Davies Report 4 (1615). In contrasting statutory laws, which are "imposed upon the subject,"
with common law' rules, which must be "tried and approved" before they assume the status of
governing rules, Davies was merely reiterating the familiar theory of common law rules as
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In describing postrevolutionary American legal theory, Horwitz asserts
that much of the historical evidence clearly reveals the growing recognition of
unprecedented judicial descretion. For example, Horwitz quotes Zepheniah
Swift from his System of Laws of Connecticut (1795) as arguing that "If a
determination has been founded as mistaken principles, or the rule adopted
by it be inconvenient, or repugnant to the general tenor of law, a subsequent
court assumes the power to vary from it or contradict it. In such cases they
do not determine the prior decision to be bad law; but that they are not
law."381 Horwitz concludes that "Swift then came as close as any jurist of the
age to maintaining that law is what the courts say it is."S9 It is dear,
however, that this characterization of precedent was a highly conventional
one, and referred to judicial authority to construe precedent collectively and
to decline to follow a judicial pronouncement deviating from the weight of
authority. In short, it was a traditiofial view of common law method regarding the construction of a general rule from previous cases, and not a claim to
modify clear rules because of some judicial policy at odds with them. The
judicial technique Swift described was addressed to the clarity of the previous
case technique, not to the weight which might be given a case which accurately represents the rule.
As Blackstone had remarked about three decades earlier in the context of
a discussion of the method of rendering a series of judicial pronouncements
internally consistent in their description of the common law rule: "For if it be
found that this former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared,
'40
not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not law.
As other writers have recognized, the discretion permitted by this procedure entailed the identification and elimination of inconsistencies in the
judicial record of common law rules, and not the rejection on policy grounds
of a clearly evidenced law. 41 If a line of relevant cases contained some judicial
originating in de facto popular consent. As Sir Frederick Pollock observed, "the elements of

reason and custom have been recognized by the highest authorities as inseparable and strengthening one another." F. POLLOCK, ESSAYS ON
3
"HoRwiTz.supra note

NECTICUT

THE

LAW 64 (1922).

1, at 25, citing SWIFT, A SYSTEM

OF THE LAWS OF THE

STATE OF

CON-

41, 46 (1975).

"gId.
4

OST. G. TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (1803) [hereinafter cited as TucKER]. Indeed
the entire discussion in Blackstone concerns preventing judicial deviation from the "authentic
record" of fixed customarily and consensually derived standards of conduct, rather than the

judicial ability to say what the law is. What Swift referred to, and what Blackstone and older
commentators were referring to, was the necessity for a particular "reasonable" decision in terms
of congruity with the entire judicial record of precedent, rather than according to some general
conception of "reasonableness." See also M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF
ENGLAND 45 (C. Gray ed. (1973)).
41
Indeed, it has long been observed that the use of the terms "reasonableness" or "inconvenience" had their origins in the judicial attempt to achieve some conformity between the particular principles of the common law and the overriding conditions of the "natural law" by excercising judicial discretion in a quite limited fashion, and not according to some general power of
"judicial legislation." See Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law, 45 HARv. L.
REv. 76, 79-82 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Winfield]. As Winfield remarked, it is obvious that
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pronouncements which were at variance with the rule articulated by the majority of them, it would of course be foolish to follow those decisions. A series
of decisions which purport to collectively state the existing legal principles
must of course raise problems of construction in litigation when a court attempts to derive the rules of law from them and determine what they mean
to a new state of facts. Horwitz thus mistakes the inevitable lack of absolute
consistency in the judicial treatment of legal rules over the course of time,
and the method developed by the common law for dealing with this inconsistency, with some creative power to legislate.
These examples should adequately illustrate the Horwitz methodology:
the highly selective use of artificially circumscribed and oversimplified
evidence in representing the old legal process, so as to exaggerate the sense of
change and novelty associated with the new process. 42 Moreover, these are intended only as illustrative examples, for an real insight into Horwitz's method
will require a somewhat more extended analytical apparatus. This will be
necessary because Horwitz not only subjects particular legal principles to his
method, but does so with whole areas of the law and the legal system;
therefore, before any meaningful evaluation of Horwitz's thesis is possible, an
alternative context for each significant legal principle used by Horwitz will
have to be presented. Only in this fashion can we test the claims for novelty
of any given element of evidence and turn the thesis for novel conception of
law which in Horwitz's opinion these elements demonstrate. This necessitates
a closer look at the cornerstones of Horwitz's case for the transformation of
American law.
THE COMMON LAW PROCESS, THE GENERAL COMMERCIAL LAW
AND CONFLICT OF LAWS

Since Professor Horwitz relies heavily upon his interpretation of the
"general commercial law" in the federal courts, particularly its treatment by
when "the founders of our common law spoke of 'reason', 'the law of reason,' 'the law of nature,'
they doubtless had a vision of some abstraction and wished to make the law harmonize with that"
Id. at 99. The fact that these ideal conditions were at times identified with "the postulated eternal immutable law of nature", rather than taking the form of the "classical creative natural law
of the seventeenth century" should not deceive the observer of the common law into believing in
some continuous, prerevolutionary "discovery" monolith employed to rationalize judicial discretion. The older authorities reveal a system much more complex than this, and the classical texts
in the nature of the law, much as ST. GmRmAIN's DOCTOR AND STUDENT. supra note 28, were in
reality expressions of what most lawyers and jurists "felt and practiced." See id. at 77. See R.
POUND, LAW AND MoRALs 36 (1923), quoted in Winfield, supra at 84 n.46. Winfield has observed the interesting fact that two quite different books, DOCTOR AND STUDENT with its theoretical
description of the "vital spirit" of the English legal system, and Fitzherbert's incredibly complex
NEW NATURA BREVIUM (1534), were both recommended by Matthew Hale to aspiring students of
English law. See Winfield, supra at 79. See generally Knight, Public Policy in English Law, 38
L.Q.R. 207 (1922).
42Amazingly, sometimes Horwitz actually splits the elements of the old or traditional common law system and calls one "old" and the other "new." Two integrally related principles in the
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the Supreme Court, and since this issue implicates an important part of
William Crosskey's debated thesis on the subject, it will be useful to address
both the common law process and the general commercial law at some
length.
The Common Law Process
First, an important distinction must be drawn between the common law
process and common law rules. 41 Though the two are related, the failure to
distinguish these two elements in the analysis of the common law system
has accounted for much confusion. The most fundamental element in
understanding both the system of rules and process which produces such rules
is an understanding that the way in which the process places limits upon
judicial discretion in the classical system is not in the "making" of law as that
process is currently understood, but rather in the application of certain
general principles in the construction of presumptively binding legal rules
contained in precedent, so as to augment and extend the precedent to new
situations. Under these decisional rules as they were conceived and articulated
in the eighteenth century, the judicial decisions comprising precedent or
authority in a particular legal point were commonly said to be "evidence" of
44
what the governing legal rule actually was.

This characterization, though often derided as a fictional rationale and
justification for judicial legislation, actually was a part of the general recognition that the common law process was comprised of several very distinct
phases. 45 These phases may be most generally described as a process of evolucommon law process are labelled as distinct because varying emphasis may be found on one element as opposed to another in previous judicial opinion, and thus the illusion of change is
created by asserting a chronology for the appearance of each element of proof which in fact did
not exist. This feat of legerdemain is one of Horwitz's finest.
4
3Differing emphasis upon these two facets of the overall process-rule content and decisional
technique-has long been a part of discussions on the common law, and has accounted for a
great deal of the confusion about the role of the common law in the post-revolutionary American
system. It is interesting that this emphasis is a natural result of the overall process of maturation
in the common law system which produces various degrees of specificity and completeness among
different subject matter areas.
"See TUCKER supra note 40, at 68-73. This of course is the conventional terminology which
was embraced in the general commercial law decisions and which has often been confused with
some "discovery" or "brooding omnipresence" characterization of the common law. Actually the
phrase was descriptive of the relationship between precedent and law, rather than descriptive of a
general legal theory alone. The way in which the rules which the precedent evidenced were in
fact circumscribed under the common law system (for example, according to locality) contradict
the characterization of such phraseology as a mere endorsement of some unfettered judicia
authority to discover correct or reasonable general uniform rules de novo in each case. Compar,
Horwitz, supra note 1, at 245 and his erroneous characterization of Swift v. Tyson, 42 U.S. (11
Pet.) 1 (1842) with notes 72-77 infra & text accompanying. See also M. HALE. THE HISTORY 0
T14E COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 45-46 (C. Gray ed. 1971); L. Lewis, The History of Judicie
Precedent (pt. II), 46 L.QR. 541, 353-55 (1930).
"Significantly, some modem writers have seen that the focus on one particular phase of tb
common law process to the partial exclusion of others has in fact accounted for much disagra
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tion from a judicial inquiry into autonomous fact-for example, the fact of a
certain general and long standing standard of party behavior, that is, a
custom-to a state in which the factual inquiry has produced in the "authentic records" of the common law a sufficiently precise and inclusive description
46
of the rules of conduct that the primary factual inquiry has disclosed.
At each stage in which a question of a similar nature occurs, the necessity
to make factual inquiry of the same type as in the original case is lessened
because the court has already created in the form of a precedent a useful,
47
The basic
though partial, description of the governing standard.
ment and confusion in the literature. As Larry Arnhart has recently pointed out, the scholarly
analysis of whether or not and how the English common law was "received" or incorporated into
the American judicial system has often been colored by this selective characterization. In discussing the conflict between the opinions of Justice Joseph Story and Professor Crosskey on the nature
of the common law in America, Arnhart remarks that "Crosskey quotes the passages in Swift v.
Tyson where Story refers to Cicero's description of a law that is the same everywhere, but
Crosskey denies that Story's decision rests on anything beyond the positive law." that is the rules
of decision actually in force. "Hence, while Story can explain the reception of the common law as
the transmission to America of those general principles of natural justice that had been a part of
the English common law, Crosskey has to demonstrate that the English common law was formally
adopted in America as positive law." Arnhart, William Crosskey and the Common Law, 9 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 545, 553 (1976). Thus the measurement of the status of the common law is conducted by the differing standards of rule content as opposed to similarity of general principles in
the decisional process. The problem with the Story-Crosskey conflict stems from a differing emphasis on the content of precedent as opposed to the principles of the decisional function. Really,
the conflict stems from the effect of the purely positivistic rationale for legal rules on the analysis
of the common law system, as opposed to a system of though less insistent on identifying the rule
content with a sovereign command. See id. at 593-94; note 73 infra & text accompanying.
"6The following general description or model should be borne in mind when considering the
particular evidence of the common law process discussed later in this section. To the degree to
which the abstract description is a valid generalization for the process, and to which the
American decisions of the nineteenth century actually conform to it, the claim for revolutionary
transformation in the common law system will be refuted. As Arnold Toynbee remarked:
The operation of constructing a model is different from the operation of testing
whether it fits the phenomena. But, so far from its being proper to dissociate the two
operations from each other, it would seem to be impossible to obtain sure results from
either of them if they are not carried out in conjunction. The model has to be constructed out of only a fraction of the total body of data, or we should never be able to
mount it for use in investigating the remainder. But, just on this account, the structure will remain tentative and provisional until it has been tested by application to all
the rest of the data within our knowledge. Conversely, our -picture of the data as a
whole will remain chaotic until we have found a model that brings out in them a pattern of specimens of a species.
A. TOYNBEE. A STunv OF HisToRY 53 (rev. ed. 1972). It is this precise task that we now have
preceded Horwitz's selective inferences from isolated data. Until this is done we are unable to
"tell whether the items in a particular conglomeration of data that we have picked out of the
chaos, like a child picking spillikins out of a heap, have hung together accidentally." Id. See also
F.

HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY

29-30 (1973).

' 7For examples from the English system where a rule produced by earlier factual inquiry attained sufficient definition so as to remove the need for further proof of custom, and to allow the
rule to be finally classified as a rule of law, see Magadara v. Hoit, 89 Eng. Ref. 597 (1691);
Bramwich v. Lloyd, 125 Eng. Ref. 870 (1699).

The degree to which a common law rule could be deemed "settled" by a congruous series of
judicial decisions was critical also in the treatment of state rules of decision by the federal courts,
especially in diversity cases. This was, however, merely a function of the established common law
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philosophical conception behind this process is that the ultimate source of the
standard is not the court, which only reflects or evidences the standard on the
occasion when its intervention is necessary, but rather the vast universe of
private activity which achieves "reciprocal orientation" of individual action by
voluntarily assuming certain modes or patterns of behavior or custom. The
actual rule is nowhere personified or ever perfectly circumscribed into an inflexible definition, because the permutations in the custom or standard as
practiced follow progressively changing patterns as society itself changes. The
"blackletter rule of law," although it constitutes the fond dream of most law
students, is at best an imperfectly articulated representation of the ongoing
process of limited judicial intervention. As many commentators have pointed
out, this "primacy of the abstract" 48 is a traditional element in the whole
common law process, and stereotyped renderings of a particular rule of law,
though known, do not themselves eliminate the necessity to understand the
application of the abstracted rule through the search for precedent. 49 In
debating the application of case law to a particular state of facts, the debate
is thereby actually focused upon the degree to which party behavior may be
said to conform to the general standard of which the abstract rule in the
cases is evidence.5 0
function of deriving articulate precedent from a course of judicial decisions and therefore pertained to state as well as federal cases. See the cases collected in R. POUND. READINGS ON THE
HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW. 227 (1913). Just as Professor Horwitz mistakes federal

cases performing an ordinary "rule construction" function or common law resolution of an extraterritorial case with overt deviations from presumptively applicable state law, see HoRwrrz,
supra note 1, 211, he also fails to appreciate the degree to which any individual case represents a
particular phase within the common law process of rule settlement. For example, at one point
Horwitz remarks that "one looks in vain for any general observations on the nature and limits of
the binding authority of commercial custom." Id. at 189. Yet the cases contained built in limitations which emerged as the judicial acknowledgement of common law rules progressed to the
stage where the statements of positive law contained in the cases was thoroughly settled. For example, The Reeside, 20 F. Cas. 458 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 11,657), which Horwitz cites on
another point, HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 197, represents the characteristic decline in judicial
willingness to liberally admit factual proof of the content of custom after the contours of the
positive rule had fully emerged in previous cases. See 20 F. Cas. at 459.
48F. HAYEK, LAW. LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 30 (1973). Significantly, Professor Horwitz
treats evidence of the abstract quality of common law rules as a postrevolutionary novelty. Hordtz, supra note 1, at 144. See J. Story, A Report of the CommissionersAppointed to Consider
and Report Upon the Practicabilityand Expediency of Reducing to a Written and Legitimate
Code the Common Law of Massachusetts, or any Part Thereof; Made to His Excellency the
Governor, January, 1837, in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 698, 701 (1951)
[hereinafter cited as Story].
4See generally Stimson & Smith, State Statute and Common Law, 2 POLITICAL SCI. Q. 105
(1887).
"Moreover, the forces external to unfettered judicial discretion of the sort envisioned by
Hobbes and his school set qualifying standards, or over-all tests for utility and "convenience", on
each individual decision since its success was largely dependent upon successful integration over a
wide variety of decisions spanning a long period of time. M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW OF ENGLAND xxxii-xxxiii, 45 (C. Gray ed. 1971). This feature of the common law process is
ignored by Horwitz's argument for a high level of authority in each individual judge. Among
courts without authority to bind other courts-i.e., among courts whose authority was inter se
persuasive-the degree of unanimity of opinion which would have been required for the unified
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The common law process itself has this essential capacity to reach ever
more mature stanges of development in two essential respects. First, the process matures in the degree to which accumulated judicial references to a
given standard have produced an effectively inclusive or complete articulation
of the standards. This causes the need for further factual inquiry to be lessened. The process of accumulating related precedent on like or similar cases is
the obvious example. Secondly, the process mature to the degree to which the
factual inquiry and gradually evolving complex evidence of the rule is extended to more and different subject matter areas. The common law when considered from the standpoint of rule content has thus achieved a state of
definition and sophistication similar to a corpus juris on some subjects,
though it is relatively incomplete as to others. 51 The various levels of maturation according to subject matter area should be born constantly in mind in
assessing the evidence which follows herein. Relatedly, the potential differences in rules among different places which, in some but not all respects,
are governed by the same general principles can also be accounted for in the
common law process. This aspect of the growth of the common law produced
the familiar distinctions between so-called "general" and "particular" or
"local" customs or laws. This multiphase process was often recognized and articulated by the jurists of the nineteenth century in a manner strikingly
parallel to the functional descriptions of the common law precedent in the
eighteenth century. As Justice Redfield of the Vermont Supreme Court
remarked in a commercial law case in 1854:
[U]ntil such rules became necessarily settled by practice, they have to be
treated as matters of fact, to be passed upon by juries; and when the rule acquires the quality of conformity and the character of general acceptance, it is
then regarded as a matter of law. It is thus that the commercial law has from
time to time grown up.5=
Thus, the common law process ultimately reached a state of maturation
in which the "authentic record" of the positive rule is to be found in the case
law.5' Obviously this created a problem with the movement of the rules
themselves along the lines of autonomous party behavior since the transactions litigated will be tested against the judicial record and not according to a
alliance with-the commercial "elite" to work is of course obvious. It is the limited nature of common law intervention, however, and the wide variety of judicial opinion forming the collective
prevailing law which makes the conspiracy which Horwitz envisions unlikely.
"STORY. supra note 48, at 706, where the feasibility of codifying the common law is
described as dependent to the degree to which any particular subject where judicial decisions
have made the legal principles capable of "distinct enunciation." See also id., at 729-30 for a
reference to distinct subject matter areas within the common law which have reached to a
"distinct" phase of "enunciation."
"Atkinson v. Brooks, 26 Vt. 569 (1854). See also STORY. supra note 48, at 698, 701 (1951).
Id. at 702-03. Compare M. HALE. THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 45-46 (C.
Gray ed. 1971).
"See F. HAYEK, LAw LEGISLATION AND LIaERTY 100 (1973).
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factual inquiry upon a clean slate. How does the system change? How is the
same progressive consensual private authority shared among various individuals and groups in society allowed to continue its influence on the formulation of the rules? This of course was one of the most critical questions in
the common law process and was in part treated under the conception of
"disuetude" or the discontinuance of a general custom by disuse or contrary
usage replacing it. This function of the process called upon the judges to
evalute claims for the irrelevance of custom or its discontinuation in fact, and
their task in so doing greatly resembled evaluation of evidence of a particular
custom allegedly displacing a general one-that is, evidence of a peculiar
local rule which constitutes a variation in the otherwise applicable general
rule. It is here that the exercise of judicial discretion was most critical, for
naturally the burden of displacing a well recorded positive rule either by
demonstrating its general or local invalidity was greater and much different
than the task of demonstrating the initial existence and content of the rule."
The judges were, in short, called upon to evaluate the relationship between
the record of autonomous party behavior-or custom-as opposed to new and
unrecorded evidence of a general or local standard deviating from that
record.
It is in the performance of this critical task that much of the evidence
Horwitz mistakes as a new conception of law was produced. It is, however,
absolutely essential to bear in mind that the exercise of judicial discretion in
this fashion was vastly different than an unfettered instrumental authority to
compose rules out of the judges' conception of good social or economic
policy. For in the case of the actual common law process, the -record as
evidence of the fact of a rule and new and contrary unrecorded facts were the
objects of judicial inquiry, and always tied judicial activity and discretion to
autonomous behavioral phenomena described in the old books under the
head of customary law. The most fundamentally significant implication of
this process is that it did not comprehend an all inclusive design or set of
social policies for the society to which it applied; it was largely based upon
the continuous recognition of an ongoing order of actions which judicial action only touched upon intermittently, and in a fashion supportive of the
ongoing order rather than in a fashion designed to manipulate or wholly
reform it. In intervening, the role of the judge was to apply the extant
"Similarly, the basic expectations supported by a particular rule may require some changes
in the applications of the rule as facts change. This function resembles the judicial acknowledgment of changes in customary practices and allows those changes to be reflected in precedent.
For example, if the raison d'etre of a property law rule was the protection of certain expectations
which private parties have about the use, enjoyment, or development of property, the common
law would permit judicial acknowledgement of changes in those expectations as the technological
possibilities for use and development made them possible. It required no transformation of legal
theory to transform the precedent in any given area. For example, consider the judicial reaction
to new development demands on the use of water in the riparian rights cases, described in HORwiTz. supra note 1, at 34, et seq.
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"authentic record" of these autonomous standards, if any, in conjunction
with an empirical investigation of their evolving use in actual practice so as to
cause the resolution of a dispute by judicial action to conform as near as
possible to the legitimate expectations of parties as determined by external
common standards of conduct. This interstitial method of dispute resolution
was often heralded by the older writers in their discussions of the "convenience" of the common law, as compared with legislation. As Sir John Davies
remarked, the common.law
doth far excell our written Laws, namely our statutes of Acts of Parliament:
which is manifest in this, that when our Parliaments have altered and changed any fundamental points of the Common Law, those alterations have been
fund by experience to be so inconvenient for the Commonwealth, as the
Common law has in effect been restored again. ..5
In short, the classical model for common law adjudication roughly sketched above is based upon an entirely different set of assumptions about the
relationship between law and judicial action on the one hand and the actions
of the individual and society on the other. It keyed the evalutation of judicial
action to the level of maturity, the rule content aspect, of the common law
according to various subject matters, and the degree to which autonomous
behavior provided a reliable guide to the formulation or exigesis of rules of
decision. Not all subjects were able to satisfy these traditional tests with equal
success, as might be expected. The point that must be borne in mind is that
highly traditional criteria may very well account for what might appear to be
a judicial "unwillingness" to follow a particular alleged rule of common law,
rather than some instrumental design to make new and better law,unrestricted by any forces external to the judicial process.16
53Davies Report 5 (1615).

"On the compatability of this theoretical description of the common law system and that
existing in eighteenth century England and American, see TUCKER. supra note 40, at 67-79 (foot-

notes omitted); Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact 51 POLITICAL ScI. REVIEWER 731 (1976). As Professor Nolan points out, though
thi commentaries were not often used so much as authority to dispose of a particular legal question as to illuminate a particular issue or legal area, its impact upon the American judiciary was
nonetheless profound as a lucid description of the English legal system. As Justice Joseph Story
remarked it was "a work of such singular exactness and perspicacity, of such finished purity of
style, and of such varied research, and learned disquisition, and constitutional accuracy, that, as
a textbook, it probably stands unrivaled in the literature of any other language." Story, The
Value and Importance of Legal Studies, in MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 503, 547
(W. Story ed. 1852).
It is clear that the various phases in the common law system and the varying degrees of
judicial discretion required to facilitate it were very much in the minds of eighteenth century
judges and jurists. The judicial functions of applying a relevant precedent to novel facts by extending its general principle to cover them included: the construction of the general rule from a
collection of somewhat inconsistent case law in order to a
whether any given case contained a
"reasonable"-that is accurate-statement of the governing rule, the required sensitivity to proof
of new custom, or the decline and abandonment of old custom, the geographic limitations
signified by the distinction between "general" customs and "particular" or local customs, the
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The basic question is, is the above model an accurate generalization of
the conception of the common law system extant during the late eighteenth
century and more importantly, if it is, how much did the adaption of this
form familiar to the American system after the revolution result in a transformation of the process and its underlying premises? To successfully
demonstrate a change in the total conception of law and judicial action,
writers such as Professor Horwitz must demonstrate not merely a change in
precedent, which is a phenomenon distinct from the source of legal obligation, but also demonstrate that whatever changes occurred did so in a manner not in conformity with an accurate model of the older conception of this
common law process.
An understanding of the origins and mechanics of judicially applied rules
during the early federal period is essential to a correct understanding of the
judicial role. The fundamental error in Horwitz's analysis lies in confusing the
terms "precedent" and "law," and a consequent failure logically to pursue the
ramifications of maintaining a once well-understood distinction between the
two in analyzing early cases. It is this fundamental distinction in the common
law decisional process which accounts for at least some of Professor Horwitz's
limitations of precedent to the sovereign from which it originated, the harmonizing of diff-fit
and potentially conflicting rules according to an extraterritorial custom, or private international
law. All these were comprehended in a complex, highly flexible evolutionary system. The resultant ability to distinguish the source of the law, the legitimizing principles behind it, and precedent or case law which it produced enabled the common law to grow both widely and quickly.
Despite Blackstone's insistence on the great age of custom which would be enforced by the courts,
Tucker stated in a footnote in his American edition of Blackstone's COMMENTARIES that:
It may be therefore doubted whether any custom can be established in the United
States of America. For, Time of memory hath been ascertained by the Law to commence from the reign of Richard I, and any custom, in England, may be destroyed by
evidence of its non-existence, at any subsequent period. Now, the settlement of North
American by the English did not take place 'till the reign of Queen Elizabeth, near
four hundred years afterwards. TuCKER supra note 40, at 76 n.7. Moreover, the same
adaptability had existed a century before he wrote.
See Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England, in ESSAYS IN
THE HISToRY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 83 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969). As Goebel described the conditions in the New England colonies, "Each colony had, of course, its peculiar characteristics, but
in the seventeenth century before the Leviathan common law had been set in motion, the basic
factor was the transplantation of local institutions and customary law." Id. at 119-120. Others, of
course, have also recognized the long standing practice of analogical extension of customary roles
within the common law process. See 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND. THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND
LAW 183 (2d ed. reissued 1968) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as POLLOCK & MAITLAND].
See also J. CARTER. LAw 69-71 (DeCapo ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as CARTER].
The ratio descedendi of the system was not the enforcement of judicially created, class
oriented rules, but the preservation of a wide range of private expectations by adjusting the
judicial record of the rules to autonomous party behavior. This theory of the common law system
could of course permit great expansion and change in the common law rules. Thus a critical
question becomes whether the inherent flexibility of the traditional system, rather than the appearance of a revolutionary new "instrumental" one accounted for the doctrinal growth during
the period considered. The conclusion of this writer is that a lack of familiarity with the decisional mechanics of the English common law system has caused Professor Horwitz to mistake
their use in America with judicial inventiveness and novelty.
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confusion about the indicia of changes in the "law," that is the basic theory,
57
as opposed to doctrinal change within an existing theory.
Indeed, Professor William Nelson in an excellent study of the operation
of the pre-revolutionary legal system in Massachusetts has concluded that
English common law and local custom played a role in the administration of
justice in that "colony." 5 Suggesting at least the possibility that a conventional adaptation of the common law system could have accounted for the
variety of new legal rules produced by the judicial process there, Nelson
describes the authority of the jury in Massachusetts to find the law as enacted
in regard to a disputed fact in a case as "virtually unlimited," which gave the
"representatives of local communities assembled as jurors ... effective power
to control the content of the province's substantive law." 5'1 Because of the
power of juries, the legal system Nelson describes could not serve as an instrument for the enforcement of coherent social policies formulated by political
authorities, either legislative or executive, whether in Boston or in local commnunities, when those policies were unacceptable to the men who happened to
be serving on a particular jury. The ultimate power of juries thus raises the
question whether the judgments rendered in the courts on a day-to-day basis
were a reflection more of law set out in statute books and in English judicial
precedents or of custom of local communities.A0 Professor Nelson concludes
"An understanding of the possibilities for expanding legal rules under the prerevolutionary
judicial system as it was then understood in England and America (certainly the understanding of
the system mAy vary from place to place in some respects) is essential to determining whether new
precedent equals new legal theory, as Horwitz claims. We cannot otherwise assess the real novelty
of each bit of evidence Horwitz adduces for the supposed transformation. For example, Horwitz
alleges that it is part of the "new" view of the law to allow private parties to calculate in advance
consequences of particular courses of conduct." HORwrrz, supra note 1, at 26. However, this
allegation of novelty arguably concerns an element in the common law process that was absolutely essential to the "old" conception, and was one of the results of the interstitial, empirical process of evolving law from autonomous fact that made the common law so "convenient," even in
the eyes of commeutators two hundred years before the American Revolution.
s4W. NE .SON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 28-29 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
NELSON].

"Id.

60It would be wrong, however, to conclude that community custom was the sole
source of prerevolutionary law. In most reported cases, lawyers called the attention of
jurors not to rules laid down by custom but to rules of common law ....
The usual
function of custom was only to fill in interstices in statute or common law ....

The

unceasing efforts of counsel to imd the rules of common law and to argue those rules
to jilries suggests. . . that juries were swayed by those rules, that they generally decid-

ed cases in accordance with them, and hence that the common law of England rather
than local custom was the usual basis of the law. But the fact remains that in every
case they decided juries possessed the power to reject the common law and that juries

as well as judges and even legislators did on occasion permit local custom to prevail
over clear common law. In short, the communities of prerevolutionary Massachusetts
freely received the common law of England as the basis of their jurisprudence but
simultaneously reserved the unfettered right to reject whatever parts of that law were
inconsistent with their own views of justice and morality or with their own needs and
circumstances.
Id. at 30.
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that both local custom and the English common law were applied by the jury
in prerevolutionary Massachusetts, and his explanation of this indicates that,
with the possible exception of the scope of the law finding function of the
jury, the Massachusetts system resembled the typical common law process, 61
The interaction between the "received" -common law of England and the articulation of local deviations, is, of course, suggestive of the frequently made
distinction between the common law as a body of rules, and the common law
as a continuous process of adjusting such rules according to new factual in6
quiry and the exegesis of extant rules. 1
The appearance in Massachusetts of a flexible and adaptive common law
system in which local opinion about presiding custom interacted with the
judicially originated statements of common law rules is revealing. It
demonstrates that prerevolutionary lawyers and jurists did not view the common law as a monolithic body of rules, the departure from which entailed a
revolution in legal theory, but rather viewed it as also entailing a process by
which the positive rules could change. Now the exact placement of the discretion to depart from precedent as between this jury and judge is of course
critical. But the varying emphasis on judge as opposed to jury had for cen- turies been critical to the adaptability of the common law process, and the
decision about when to "let in" new custom or practice to modify the effects
of a given common law rule had occurred before the revolution. Christopher
St. Germain's account of the differing authority to determine general as opposed to local custom was one example,63 but so were the perennial outcries
about the variation between a previously acknowledged common law rule and
current practice, 64 a phenomenon common to the centuries both preceeding
and following the American Revolution. 65 For this not to have been so, the
adjustment of rule to practice in the common law process, that is such things
as discretion and the proof of new or local custom, would have to have been
self executing. They were not, but rather called for some judicial discretion,
albeit prompted by the urgings of private parties and their advocates. But the
main point is that the Horwitz thesis so understates and ignores the discretionary dynamics of the conventional or traditional system that he mistakes
the ordinary for the revolutionary." Thus a number of features in the
11

TUCKER. supra note 40, at 68-76,

62Jones, The Common Law in the United States: English Themes and American Variations,
in POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY 92, 134 (H. Jones ed. 1976).

"5See note 65 infra.

6

4Id.

6

"Compare the reaction to Lord Holt's reliance on rules at variance with the prevailing
practice, in C. FIFOOT, LORD MANSFIELD 15-17 (1936) and the complaints of the commercial
community against the common law courts in the nineteenth century discussed in Chorley, The
Conflict of Law and Commerce, 48 L.Q.R. 51 (1932). See also I. PLUCKNr-rT, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, 342-50 (5th ed. 1956).
"Indeed, Nelson provides further evidence of this awareness in the concluding chapter of
his work, in which he describes how juries were brought under control of the courts, and the entire Massachusetts system first rigidified, when judges followed precedent closely, and then, by
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prerevolutionary common law process relate directly to judicial discretion,,
and comprise the traditional dynamics of judicial action by the common law
system which modem writers mistakenly regard as novel. First was the conception of legal obligation and the source of rules as distinct from precedent.
Change in the former simply cannot be proven by pointing to change in the
latter. Next was the process of "rule settlement," whereby the judicial inquiry
into the application of a formerly recognized principle provided a good deal
of discretion. Unless previous cases spoke intelligibly about litigated factual
situation, some relatively more independent judgment by the judiciary was
necessary in order to resolve the case.' 7 Similarly, the necessary decision about
the accuracy with which any given opinion in a larger number of opinions
reflected the rule which cases sought to collectively articulate often provided a
degree of judicial discretion." As Blackstone described the process, the
general adherence to particular precedent admitted "of exception where the
former determination is most evidently contrary to reason .......
This was
not a license to reject any given law for policy reasons. Judges "do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate an old one from misrepresentation."' 0
Thus, in the process of "rule settlement" the effective limits of individual
judicial descretion are largely set by the coherency of the judicial declarations
taken as a whole and compared with any one such pronouncement. As Sir
the 1820's relaxed, when judges began to accept the "propriety" of departure from precedent.
NELSON. supra note 58, at 167-74. Nelson describes the reasons for this "shift in attitude" as being the transfer of law-fmding power from juries to judges, which threatened to "impose a straitjacket on future legal development" and the fact that judicially administered legal change had
become "an abiding and unavoidable feature of the legal system," by the early nineteenth century, which in turn resulted in a situation whereby if "judges [had] said that they were merely
applying precedent in bringing about such change" they would have been ignoring reality. Id. at
171. Apparently, Professor Nelson means that the "shift in attitude" by the judges was toward a
view that they could make law, or, in his words, "that the direction of change was a matter of
choice from competing policies rather than deduction from first shared principles." However, the
early nineteenth century system he describes is perfectly compatible with the traditional common
law system, leading one to suspect that Professor Nelson may be confusing an ongoing evolution
of custom, and a consequent expansion or refinement of the precedent designed to evidence
custom, with a mere departure from or "overruling" of precedent.
Nelson identifies certain contemporary statements about the common law with what he feels
is a totally novel recognition of a new sort of judicial authority. For example, Chief Justice
Parker's remark that the "principles of common law ....
[would] undoubtedly apply" coupled
with the observation that the application of those principles would vary from age to age, was
taken by Nelson as an insight which the judges in the prerevolutionary era failed to have. Id. at
172. But again what indicates the novelty of those observations? Similarly, the absence of any
real cohesive "procommercial elite" in the sense of a monolithic and unified force, pushing the
development of precedent entirely in one direction suggests the process for change rested on influences which were much more diffuse than Horwitz suggests. See the discussion of this point in
Presser, Book Review, Revising the Conservative Tradition, Towards a New American Legal
History 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 700, 706 (1977).
"TucmER, supra note 40, at 69.
'Ild. at 69-71.
611d. See also POLLACK & MAITLAND, supra note 56, at 184-85.
78Id. at 70.
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Matthew Hale put it, the "consonancy and congruity" of decisions was in the,
long run an effective guide to their correctioness and weight, and it was this
standard, and not individual judicial perceptions which measured the
"reasonableness" of a particular pronouncement." When carefully considered, this is of course one of Professor Horwitz's more extreme oversimplifications of the process, though admittedly oversimplification is more
acceptable than selective, misleading and incomplete use of data. For dearly
no such judge or group of judges could escape the matrix of rules being
observed by the greater number, or the forces which operate upon the exercise of judicial discretion, such as the metamorphosis of autonomous practice
along which the adjustments of precedential record in the common law process gradually, if roughly, followed. The conspiratorial antics of the great
mass of the American judiciary, glancing sidelong at one another as they step
in unison to gratify big business by consciously overthrowing the private law
of the country is somehow a spectacle which one finds difficult to accept
without some real proof. Simplifying the complex forces working a change of
precedent so that they fit some linear neo-Marxian model explaining all such
phenomena as manifestations of class interests is of course a handy way of
dispensing with most data beyond the change in precedent.
Additionally, the geographically limited application of some governing
rules-represented by the distinction between general and local laws-entailed the judicial evaluation of evidence establishing deviations from the
previously acknowledged common law rules. As will be shortly demonstrated,
many cases dealing with this ordinary process of assigning certain weight to
both localized peculiarities and to allegedly general deviations from a rule
which had become relatively settled in previous precedent, have been
mistaken by Horwitz as shifts in and out of entirely different conceptions of
law. The case law, however, made it clear that once a customary rule, such
as a rule of private international law of a commercial nature, had universally
established itself and become judicially recognized in precedent among a
variety of states and nations, naturally the burden of proving as a matter of
fact that the weighty record of party behavior should be called into question,
in particular places or generally, was quite high. This was only a method of
establishing stability through the use of a reasonable presumption given to
evidence of the widespread utility and universal approval of a particular way
of doing things; it did not foreclose an inquiry into the facts of autonomous
party behavior in future cases.
Lastly the integration of this decisional system with the American Federal
Constitution provided still more jurisdictional complications and controversy
surrounding the relative authority among different sovereignties.
It will now be useful to take this collection of decisional principles and
employ them to test the Horwitz thesis. The degree to which their presence in
I'M. HALE. THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 45-46 (C. Gray ed. 1971).
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the case law relied on by Horwitz accounts for precedential change will
hopefully enable us to more reliably assess the "transformation" thesis.
The General Commercial Law and Conflict of Laws
As Professor Horwitz correctly observes, "One of the most interesting and
puzzling developments in all of American legal history is the appearance of
the Supreme Court's decision in Swift v. Tyson in 1842."'12 As a case brought
under the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, Swift raised questions about the
effect of local or state common law rules and, should state law be in applicable, the content of potentially alternative rules of decision. Horwitz attempts to analyse both the independence of the federal judiciary from
peculiar "localized" rules of commercial law, which would have in the
absence of diversity jurisdiction been applied by state courts, and the apparent variations in the opinions of the Supreme Court about the status and
content of the general commercial law. However, he does so within the
"transformation" dialetic applied to state cases. Further, this shift from purely state cases to the federal opinions involves a set of totally new relationships
between the federal and state governments and, in the context of the diversity
jurisdiction, among the states themselves-a point either generally unknown
to or ignored by Professor Horwitz. He did, however, sufficiently recognize
that something in the universe of legal relationships with which law dealt had,
changed in the shift to federal case law, so that he felt compelled to call on
William Crosskey for help, albeit to employ one of the weakest aspects of
Crosskey's general theseis. s In the context of Horwitz' thesis, the basic issue is
7

2HoRwrrz. supra note 1, at 245; Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
"Horwitz argues, "As Professor Crosskey saw, 'the now prevailing conflicts-of-laws technique
ha[d] little application in the eighteenth century and was the slow development of a later time,'
roughly after 1820. The shift to a 'conflicts' approach reflected the erosion of the orthodox view
that, since judicial decisions were mere 'evidence' of a 'true' legal rule, a conflict of decisions inevitably meant that one of those rules was simply mistaken. The field of conflicts of laws, then,
arose to express the novel view that incompatible legal rules could be traced to differing social
policies and that the problem of resolving legal conflicts by assuming the existence of only one
correct rule from which all deviation represented simple error." HoRwrrz, supra note 1, at 246.
Two basic errors are contained in Horwitz' interpretation of Crosskey: First, the notion that a
belief in the natural law foundation of legal rules entailed the assumption that all particular
rules of law would of necessity be identical is entirely false, since the structure of the natural or
eternal law argument entailed the use of those more abstract notions of the legitimacy of legal
rules as theoretical and philosophical justifications for particular rules that admittedly differed
from place to place, or nation to nation. The positive laws among nations were justified by the
theorems of natural and eternal laws but their precise content was not required by this theory to
be identical, whatever the different epistomotogical views of the natural law philosophies
throughout history may have been. See HALE, CONSIDERATIONS ToUCHsING THE AMENDMENT OR
ALTERATION OF LAWS, in

I.

HARGRAVE,

A COLLECTION OF TRAcTs RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF

ENGLAND. 269-70 (1787). Compare the various forms of law and ultimate source of legal rules in
T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA. Pars Secunda Q. 91 Arts. I-V, with Germain, supra note 28,
at 4. Human laws or positive laws were generally treated as "particular determinations" which
though possessing a good deal of variety, simply conformed to certain "other essential conditions"
of a general nature for their validity. T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Pars Secunda Q. 91, Art.

INDIANA LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 53:449

this: was there a growing body of transcendent legal rules known as the
"general commercial law" which was acknowledged by the federal courts and
which would literally supercede otherwise applicable state rules of law, and if
this is so, is this evidence of a willingness of the federal courts, like their state
bretheren, to engage in self conscious, interest-oriented judicial legislation?
a. Obligatory "Local" Law in the Federal Courts
In order to deal with this dual question it is necessary to first consider the
true scope of the federal power in regard to diversity jurisdication. In Swift v.
Tyson,74 Mr. Justice Story construed § 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to
make certain local laws obligatory in the federal courts, but to exclude certain kinds of laws from its operation. Justice Story regarded as obligatory "the
positive statutes of the state . . ." and state cases construing them, and laws

pertaining "to things having a permanent locality," such as real estate, and
other "matters . . . intraterritorial in their nature." 5 Contrariwise, nothing

required the federal courts to follow state laws applicable "to questions of a
more general nature. '76 Furthermore, Story clearly did not make the distinction between statutes and case law determinative of what was obligatory, but
rather included both within the scope of the obligation to follow local law.
The obligation was determined by the nature of the question and not by the
7
nature of the legal pronouncement.
In the first place, Story referred not only to statutes as obligatory but also
as "established local customs having the force of laws." 7 8 Further it was clear
that there was a distinct interplay between extraterritorial matters and local
customs, which could become sufficiently developed and certain to counteract
the general principles, in which case they would control. 79 Additionally, commercial cases arising under the diversity jurisdiction were by definition extraterritorial to the sovereignty of any single state. Clearly Justice Story
recognized that this implicated a pool of case law including but not limited to
III. Horwitz's implicit contention that the underlying belief in the system would require the rules
of negotiability, for example, to be literally the same among various states or nations is rather
absurd. However there are even more profound objections to his statement. In the manner in
which private international law and conflict of laws rules actually developed and were employed
in America after the Revolution, clearly no such requirement of literal rule conformity was ever
thought necessary. See text infra in this section. Secondly, Horowitz's statement of the meaning
and Crosskey's quote is mistaken and misleading. W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTrrUTION
IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
1441

563 (1953).

U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).

15Id. at 18-19.
WId. at 18.
"7Id. See the erroneous conclusion in this point drawn by Professor Gray in J.
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 254-56

GRAY. THE

(2d rev. ed. 1972).

"41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
79Cf. Bliven v. New England Screw Co., 64 U.S. (23 How.) 420, 433 (1859); Hazard's
Adm'r v. New English Marine Ins. Co., 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 557 (1834).

1978]

AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY

that of any given states, and called for an independent judgment on the part
of the federal courts. In such cases "the state tribunals are called upon to
perform the like function as ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon general
reasoning and legal analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract of
instrument, or what is the just rule furnished by the principles of commercial
law to govern the case." 80 To have done otherwise would have been to abdicate their primary function in diversity cases-to insure impartial justice
between citizens of different states.
Equally important, however, was the recognition of a variety of subject
matters which were or could be "localized" by a state, so that the local rule
could be obligatory on the federal courts. Most importantly, "localization" required a particularform of local pronouncement about the legal issue in
question and a congruity between the commercial and private international
law conflict principles. A body of interstate common law rules dictated when
and under what circumstances one state could localize a transaction Vis a vis
another. The case law taken as a whole reveals that federal courts would
defer to localization, by statute or judicial decison, only in accordance with
general conflict of laws principles. This was, moreover, a practice in accord
with conceptions of sovereignty inherent in both the federal and state cases.81
Under these conceptions, sufficiently clear local laws-either statutes or decisions-would be obligatory when they pertained to matters local per se, such
as real property within the state, and where they pertained to certain features
of commercial transactions as well. 82 The federal case law makes it clear that
the judges were concerned with determining which set of potentially relevant
rules the private parties may legitimately have assumed were relevant to their
transaction. In cases where an articulate localization had taken place, even if
the rule thereby promulgated differed from the general rules of the law mer8041 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842).
81
Even so, the cases would have to speak to a differing fact situations, and speak with sufficient clearity about the legal rule. Otherwise the federal courts would have to engage in a construction of whatever authority there was, even if the local laws were statutory in form, or took
the form of unclear judicial pronouncements construing statutes.
See, e.g., Richardson v. Curtis, 20 F. Cas. 707 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1855) (No. 11,781). See also
Townsend v. Todd, 91 U.S. 452, 453 (1875): "The question depends upon the recording acts of
the State of Connecticut; and we are bound to follow the decision of the state in their construction of those acts, 0f there has been a uniform course of decisions among them." (emphasis added). The point in the text is closely related also the the practice of the federal courts to
disregard state decisions in diversity cases when the parties had entered into their transaction,
etc. under a prior course of decisions. The federal courts would, however, be reluctant to construe local statutes, since any construction of ambiguous language might be at variance with the
meaning ultimately ascribed to it by the state cases. See Coates v. Muse, 5 F. Cas. 1116
(C.C.D.Va. 1822) (No. 2,917). Thus, construction of statues unaided by state judicial decision
was, according to Chief Justice Marshall, therefore, a matter of necessity, to be entered into only
reluctantly; and the reason was that the "exposition of the acts of every legislature . . . the
peculiar and appropriate duty of the tribunals, created by that legislature." Id. at 1117.
8219 F. Cas. 1270 (W.D.Va. 1846) (No. 11, 383), affd on other grounds, 29 U.S. (18 How.)
470 (1850).

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 53:449

chant, and the shared extraterritorial rules of sovereignty-the conflict of
laws rules-pointed to the state where the localization had occured, the rule
would be followed, but not otherwise. 8 Thus, rather than the "either-or"
conflict between the transcendent and instrumental general law and applicable local law, the pattern that actually emerged was one in which parties
to commercial transactions were obligated under the conflict of laws principles which controlled commercial cases to look to the appropriate state, in
order to determine whether there had been a localization by statute or
custom, of the relevant controlling law. If none was found, it could be
presumed that the general custom prevailing in the commercial world would
be applied, at least in the federal courts in cases within the diversity jurisdiction. This did not, of course, eliminate all uncertainty from interstate commercial dealings; but it did provide a regularized, relatively coherent system
within which the expectations of the parties to various commercial transactions could be generally preserved intact. Moreover, it provided ample space
for local variations from general commercial jurisprudence, enforceable in
both state and federal courts, thus securing the only important state and par84
ty interests in the application of local rules.
Not only would the common pursuit of rules limiting state sovereignty be
conducted by the federal and state courts, but also both sets of courts consistently observed further limitations on common law authority, which were
designed to better serve private expectations. For example, the federal courts
would not follow local decisions, even where they were clear, in cases where
the decisions had become settled only after the transaction litigated had occurred. 5 Thus the timing of the state precedent with respect to the disputed
"I1d. at 1272. There were of course many commercial cases, like Prentice, in which the
federal courts routinely adhered to state decisions construing state statutes, construing such
statutes independently only when no state authority was available to assist them. See, e.g., Oates
v. National Bank, 100 U.S. 239 (1879); Townsend v. Todd, 91 U.S. 452 (1875); Sumer v. Hicks,
67 U.S. (2 Black) 532 (1862); Henshaw v. Miller, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 212 (1854); Brasher v. West,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 608 (1833); Beach v. Viles, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 675 (1829); DeWolf v. Rabaud, 26
U.S. (1 Pet.) 476 (1828); Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) (1828); Paine v. Wright, 18 F. Cas.
1010 (C.C.D. Ind. 1855) (No. 10,676); Greene v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1151 (C.C.D.R.I. 1854) (No.
5,766); Cleverand P. & A.R. Co. v. Franklin Canal Co., 5 F. Cas. 1044 (C.C.W.D. Penn. 1853)
(No. 2,890), Betton v. Valentine, 3 F. Cas. 311 (C.C.D.R. 1852) (No. 1, 370); Boyle v. Arledge.
3 F. Cas. 1108 (C.C.D.Ark. 1849) (No. 1,758); Bennett v. Boggs, 3 F. Cas. 221 (C.C.D.N.J.
1830) (No. 1,319).
84A full development of all the cases wherein the federal courts would differ to local
authority, as opposed to presuming that private parties had acted under the expectation that extraterritorial rules were relevant to their conduct, is beyond the scope of this work. For a more
complete description of the shared common law rules governing the choice between state and extraterritorial authority, see R. BRIDWELL & R. WHIrrTEN. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON
LAW. THE DECLINE OF THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM. (1977).
"This was especially true when the retroactive enforcement of a common law rule would
have placed a disproportionately heavy burden on nonresidents, whose expectations were central
to the diversity jurisdiction. Compare Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841) and
Rowan v. Runnels, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 134 (1847) with Nesmith v. Sheldon, 48 U.S. 17 (7 How.)
812 (1849). It is interesting to note that in the former two casts wherein the Supreme Court
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transaction, and a decisional principle disfavoring retroactivity under certain
conditions, plus the required correspondence between sovereignty-limiting
rules of interstate common law, plus the rule construction function which
often required an independent judgment about the content of local law, all
served to provide a context for the diversity cases infinitely more complex
than the "transcedant instrumental law v. local law" dichotomy supporting
the transformation thesis.' 6 An examination of the early federal cases involving more than one state illustrates a complicated judicial function which is
not adequately explained by Horwitz.
b. Single State v. Multistate Elements in the Common Law
In finding that the federal courts indulged in self conscious, interest
oriented judicial legislation creating a general commercial law, Proffessor
Horwitz discusses several early federal cases and the celebrated Swift opinion.
For example in Mandeville v. Riddle (1803),81 Justice Marshall speaking for
the Court reversed a lower court opinion in a diversity case which had held
that, despite a Virginia rule against the negotiability of promissory notes,
which would have been necessary to permit assignees of such notes to sue
remote assignors in a claim of assignment, the assignee could sue anyway, a
result apparently contrary to the state rule. In reversing, Marshall (according
to Horwitz) held that a state statute would have been necessary to confer
assignability or negotiability upon such notes. Absent this, the federal court
should not allow recovery. As Horwitz saw the significance of the decision,
"Most important of all in terms of the much debated issue of whether the
early federal judiciary enforced a general commercial law, Marshall treated
the question as simply one of applying Virgina law, offering not the slightest
suggestion that the federal courts had any independent power to establish
refused to give retroactive impact to state court decisions which would have disallowed transactions apparently legal when consummated, the burden of the state decision would be felt
primarily by nonresident holders of negotiable instruments taken by exchange for slaves sold
within the state in question. In Nesmith, however, wherein the court followed local law which affected transactions apparently legal when consummated, the burden of complying with the decision fell equally upon residents and nonresidents alike, which of course helped to dispel the suggestion of bias present in Groves and Rowan.
8'For other cases discussing the limits imposed in the operation of state law in diversity
cases, consider Union Bank v. Jolly's Adm'rs, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 503 507 (1855); Watson v.
Tarpley, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 517 (1855) referring to the necessity for imposing the limitations on
the operation of local law described in the text so that local laws would not "affect, either by
enlargement or diminution, the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States as vested and
prescribed by the constitution and laws of the United States.. ." Id. at 520. Professor Horwitz
sees Watson as further evidence of an "instrumental" conception of law, HoRwrrz, supra note 1,
at 225 n.57, but it appears from the facts of the case that conventional private international law
conflict rules would not have subjected the plaintiff to the Mississippi statute, that is this would
not be a case where Mississippi could "localize" the rule of decision under these facts. The Watson opinion regarded the Mississippi rule as "a violation of the commercial law, which a state
woud have no power to impose." Id.
875 U.S. (3 Cranch) 290 (1803). HoRwrrz, supra note 1, at 220.
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rules of commercial law."8 This significant case was brought up a second
time six years later, resulting in what Horwitz claimed to be a reversal of
Marshall's original position. 9 The Chief Justice, "despite the contrary view of
the Virginia judges," held "out of the blue" that the endorsee could sue a
remote endorser.9 0 This result, according to Horwitz, meant the "Marshall's
own conception of the underlying source of negotiability had radically shifted
from the position that it arose only through legislative command to the view
that it was founded on 'the general understanding' of the nature of the contract itself." 91
The implicit assumption relied upon by Horwitz is that the law of
Virginia was applicable to the case, absent some federal rule which might
displace it. This assumption alone renders Horwitz explanation deficient
because the issue was not exclusively the effect of the "legislative command"
of Virginia upon the parties' contract, but rather it included the relevance of
the laws of other states, as well as principles of law common to more than
one state in a multi-state transaction. The form of the local rule was not so
important to the outcome of a case under diversity jurisdiction as was the
limitation on the effect of the local law, however manifest, upon a multistate
transaction. The federal courts' general understanding of the conflict of laws
rules set limits on the effect of any loal law and a federal court could depart
from it by adverting to a common multistate rule or the rule of some other
state involved in the transaction without displacing the local rule with a
federal one. Horwitz's presumption of the applicability of the rule taken from
the state where the federal court is sitting is a corollary of his "either-or, instrumental v. local" dialectic, but unfortunately belies an ignorance of the
92
principles of federalism observed by the federal courts.
93
Horwitz treats these and other apparently commercial law decisions,
and the subsequent Swift opinion by Joseph Story as an endorsement of a
B5HORWITZ. supra note 1, at 221.
"9Riddle v. Mandeville, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 322 (1809).
9OHoRwiTZ, supra note 1, at 223.

"ld. at 221.

"The diversity jurisdiction upon which the original suit was based necessarily raised issues
other than the abstract relationship between the federal courts and the single state of Virginia.
The extraterritorial form of the transaction in question-a note ultimately endorsed to a citizen
of another state- potentially implicated the rules of the foreign state and consequently the rules
of private international law which would be relevant to differences among the legal rules of states
implicated in the transaction. This result was necessarily tied to the question of the degree to
which the federal courts were bound by the local view of Virginia alone. In short, Horwitz has
provided no analysis of the degree to which non-federal rules of law obligatory on federal courts
sitting in diversity cases included interstate rules, which set the limits on the ability of individual

states inter sese, to "localize" legal rules for multistate transactions. Since interstate relations in
the private law area were involved in such diversity cases along with federal-state relations, the
role of private international law, including conflict of laws rules, was a critical question in diversity litigation and the resolution of these issues explains the superficially dissimilar results of the
federal case law. However, Horwitz merely treats the dissimilarities in the holdings as battle over
the acceptance of transcendent commercial law in federal courts.
"See his treatment of Withers v. Greene, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 213 (1850) in HoRwrrz. supra
note 1, at 224.
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general commercial body of law and related judicial authority to "discover"
its contents, subject to the important limitation that state rules in a statutory
form, unlike "discovered" common law rules, are obligatory on the federal
courts in diversity cases."4 The issue is thus simply put: Will the federal courts
abide by local rules or, in an ultra-traditional reversion to the natural law
"discovery" model as described by Howitz, will they rather follow their own
abstract concept of the general law?9 5 Swift was thus a return to the "pure"
natural law discovery model of judicial decisions to vindicate the new partisan, interest-oriented "instrumental conception" of law. Further Horwitz
argues that, ironically, the efficacy of the Swift opinion itself was eroded by
the rise of the "conflicts approach" pursuant to which a federal court could
selectively opt out of the otherwise binding local state rules. Though the conflict of laws principles employed by the federal courts were an assault on the
natural law theory used in Swift to avoid undesirable local rules of law, the
conflicts approach itself served the same instrumental ends. All this is just
about as wrong as it could be.
Critical to the understanding of the actual significance of the general
commercial law and conflict of laws principles as employed by the federal
judiciary and their relationship to the source of legal obligation is an
understanding of the relationship between these subjects and the law of na04Hoawrrz, supra note 1, at 225, where Horwitz erroneously asserts that Watson v. Tarpley,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 517 (1855) was retreat from the natural law thesis of Swift. Watson is disiussed
later in this section.
"See HoRwrrz, supra, note 1, at 245-46. The status of the "general law" dealt with in
Swift v. Tyson is in typical fashion treated by Horwitz in terms of the "declaratory" theory, which
would permit freedom from judicial pronouncements of the states since these were undifferentiated "evidence" of actual laws, and require only the observance of state statutes by federal
courts. See id. at 245. The positivistic view of law, classifying even judicial decisions as sovereign
pronouncements, and the "discovery" theory which would not so classify them, were made to
seem in conflict. This misleading characterization of the "old" view has produced a misleading
characterization of Swift itself.
Thus, by this point, the discrete views of the state courts and jurists, those of the federal
judiciary, the complex questions of interstate relations and federalism involved in diversity cases,
and the role of private international law rules in settling these issues in both the federal and state
courts, are all subsumed under the natural law v. positivism dialectic that is the heart of the
"transformation" theme. As Horwitz remarks:
The jurisprudence of the treatise on Confl'cts (by Justice Story] shows no trace of the
view that differing [legal] rules of commercial law can be reconciled by reference to
one overriding general law. Indeed, the treaties is written precisely because such a view
of law can no longer satisfactorily explain the existence of a growing number of conflicting legal rules. In short, the conception of law put forth by Mr. Justice Story in
Swift v. Tyson stands sharply opposed to the jurisprudence of his treatise on Conflict of
Laws written just eight years before.
HoRwrrz, supra note 1, at 248-49. The essentially narrow description of the natural law tradition
and the alleged incompatability between divergent legal rules (or the acceptance of them as fact)
and the continuation of the former natural law basis for rules has again produced the impression
of profound change, and of a massive change of mind affecting nearly every one over the span of
a few years. However, the method by which the rules of private international law including the
"general commercial law" were integrated with the diversity jurisdiction through traditional common law processes reveals that the Swift v. Tyson approach was perfectly compatible with the approach in Story's treatise on Conflict of Laws.
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tions generally. Just as the law of nations must deal with multinational transactions, the creation of a federal goveinment in the United States required a
means of dealing with multistate transactions. The means employed were not
novel in that they followed the pattern set by international law, and followed
a pattern of judicial decision-making which repeated the earlier incorporation
of multinational principles in the English common law.96 In understanding
the role of commercial law as a part of the law of nations, it is important to
recognize that there was originally no sharp distinction drawn between civil
admiralty and maritime jurisprudence and commercial law. They were one
and the same jurisprudence, and only after the passage of time did they
become thought of as separate parts of international law. 97 Consequently,
because commercial law was originally customary law, and because it was also
a branch of private international law, it was dealt with in the same fashion
by the courts as cases within the general customary system of common law
adjudication.98
"sSack, ConfUct of Laws in the History of English Law, in 3 LAW, A CENTURY
342 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Sack].
7

OF

PROGRESS

1 G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 5 (2d ed. 1975). See also T.
PLUCKNETT. A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 657-59 (5th ed. 1956); Scrutton, General
Survey of the History of the Law Merchant, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY 7-8, 11-12 (1909) [hereinafter cited as Scrutton]. See also, Adler, Business
Jurisprudence, 28 HARv. L. REV. 135 (1914); Burdick, What is the Law Merchant?, 2 COLUM. L.
REv. 470 (1902); Ewart, What is the Law Merchant?, 3 COLUM. L. REv. 135 (1903); Kerr, The
Origin and Development of the Law Merchant, 15 VA. L. REv. 350 (1929); Thayer, Comparative
Law and the Law Merchant; 6 BROOKLYN L. REv. 139 (1936); Tudsbery, Law Merchant and the
Common Law, 34 LAW Q. REv. 392 (1918). See CROSSKEY, supra note 73 at 568:
"Hence, [in the eighteenth century] it was considered that there was, in such cases, a
complete defect of applicable local law; and the natural law, modified by international
custom, was again regarded, in the rather rare cases in which such questions arose, as
the appropriate rule of decision. But it was a natural law, and customs, as to what to
do when such foreign local matters were involved."
98STORY. supra note 48 at 698, 705 (1851). See also the extensive reporters note to
Mandeville v. Riddle, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 290 (1803), found at id. 367. The note contains an excellent description of how the commerical law was received by the federal courts, and seems
strongly to indicate that the process was one of deriving law from custom, rather than any intrumental process. See especially id. at 374. Moreover, there were numerous state cases in which
the same view was taken of the international customary character of the commercial law process.
Perhaps the most enlightening state case expanding upon the concept that commerical custom
and usage were part of the law of nations was Atkinson v. Books, 26 Vt. 569 (1854). Judge Redfield, in an eloquent opinion, dealt with an issue similar to that which had confronted Story in
Swift v. Tyson: whether a bona fide holder, who had accepted the note as collateral security for
a preexisting debt, was indeed a holder for value. He then referred "to the English law, and the
general commercial law." According to
the general commercial usuage, there is, then, no essential difference in principle,
whether a current note or bill is taken in payment, or as collateral security for a prior
debt, provided the note is, in both cases, truly and unqualifiedly negotiated, so as to
impose upon the holder the obligation to conform to the general rules of the law merchant in enforcing payment.
Id. at 574.
For other state cases, accepting the general rule of Swift, whether extended to include
holders for collateral security of merely for payment, or whether decided before or after Swift
itself, see Petrie v. Clarke, 11 Serg. & Rawl 377 (Pa. 1824); Steinmetz v. Currie, 1 Dall. 269 (Pa.
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Similarly there was eventually a clear identity of function between
substantive commercial law rules and conflict of laws rules which governed
their application. It was thus quite appropriate for eminent writers on these
subjects to describe conflict of laws doctrine as but a "branch of commercial
law."99 The conflict of laws rules designed to serve legitimate party expectations and intentions by making it universially obvious which of the potentially
involved substantive rules applied to any given case. The commercial law
rules interacted with the conflict of laws rules to serve this end. This was
possible because of the increasingly regular, sterotyped forms which the commercial law had in many of its aspects assumed. It had become, as it were, a
sort of international or interstate language, which enabled the parties to
engage in "reciprocal orientation of their actions" across state lines.100
For example, it was clear to parties in commerce from the facts of a
transaction, particularly the forms by which it was conducted, whether or not
it pertained to an extrateritorial as opposed to a purely municipal or local set
of governing rules. Various sets of rules, including customary ones both
recorded and unrecorded in precedent, were present to govern or control
most any transaction, and the conflict of laws principles when logically applied to a given transaction revealed whether it was confined to a particular
sovereign or not. Thus, in creating a negotiable bill of exchange, certain
commonly recognized features were necessary before the instrument became
negotiable, a quality considered to be the very essence of such an instrument,
and to constitute "its true character."' 0' Such terms as "or order" and "or
bearer" were, according to the general or extraterritorial methods of commerce, essential to negotiability. The form which the transaction assumed according to the common multi-state language of commerce determined
whether its consequences were to be measured by one set of rules or another,
that is by particular, or local, as opposed to general, or multistate rules.
It is of course quite tempting to view the conflicts approach as the real
antithesis of the general commercial law in that the latter signifies an identical
substantive rule shared by various sovereigns while the former signifies a set of
1788). See also Carlisle v. Wishort, 11 Ohio 173, 192 (1842). See generally Story, Growth of the
Commereial Law, in W.

STORY. THE MiscELLArNEous WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY

262 (1852). It is

clear that both federal and state courts were acutely aware of the disutility of extensive departure
from the rules of general commercial law. See Aud v. Magruder, 10 Cal. 282 (1858), where the
California Supreme Court discusses this issue at length.
91j. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE 136 n.3 (4th ed. 1860)
[hereinafter cited as STORY. BILLS OF EXCHANGE].
01
1 J. STORY. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PROMISSORY NOTES 184-84 (6th ed. 1868)
[hereinafter cited as STORY, PROMISSORY NOTES]. Compare STORY. BILLS OF EXCHANGE, supra
note 99 at 136 et seq., with STORY. PROMISSORY NOTES supra at 176 et seq., and STORY. BILLS OF
EXCHANGE, supra note 99 at 175 et seq., 183-85, 216, with STORY. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws at 575 et seq., 598 (3d ed. 1946), respectively, for another illustration of the integral relationship in the textual treatment of commercial law and conflict of laws.
''1STORY. BILLS OF EXCHANGE, supra note 99, § 3. See generally id. §§ 32-69, at 41 et seq.
on the requisites of a negotiable bill and the characteristics it assumes by becoming negotiable.
See C.

TEDEMAN.

A TREATISE ON THE LAW

OF COMMERCIAL PAPER §§

1-9, at 1-24 (1889).
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independent rules which determines which of various different sovereign rules
prevail at the expense of others. This is the antitethical characterization made
by Professor Horwitz: but what if several sovereigns who would be implicated
in a multistate transaction have different rules on the substantive principle at
issue (for example the requisites of negotiation, or the effects of receiving
negotiable paper as collateral security, or the particular terms of restrictive
endorsement) but would, on the other hand, all choose the same sovereign as
the source of the applicable rule? Are identical conflict of laws principles
themselves a part of the general commercial law even though they sometimes
result in the application of a substantive rule observed by only one of several
implicated sovereigns? Naturally the problem of classification was somewhat
ambiguous, and unless one placed so much emphasis on the technicalities of
rule selection in multistate transactions so as to insist that true general commercial law includes only substantive commercial rules but not other legal
rules, then the relationship between choice of law or conflict of laws rules and
the substantive rules themselves becomes obvious'0 2 Indeed, the employment
'0t Professor Horwitz's observation 'that the process of selecting among admittedly different
governing standards, as opposed to applying a "universal" or "general" law was per se a repudiation of the "natural law theory" which could contemplate only one "true rule" is unsupportable.
Actually many early cases within England acknowledged the difference between various local
customs and formulated a sort of "intranational" choice of law approach dependent upon a
classification of the cases resembling the continental distinction between "personal" and "real"
statutes or laws. See Rutter v. Rutter, 23 Eng. Rep. 400 (ch. 1683); Chomley v. Chomley, 23
Eng. Rep. 663 (ch. 1688); Webb v. Webb, 23 Eng. Rep. 680 (ch. 1689). Likewise the
acknowledgment of these distinct customs, the acknowledgment of the content of the "general"
law, or law merchant, and the content of a possible deviant local foreign law, were all dealt with
the initial, factual inquiry stage of the common law process. On the "general law" see Vanheath
v. Turner, 124 Eng. Rep. 20 (C.P. 1621); Pierson v. Pounteys, 80 Eng. Rep. 91 (K.B. 1609). On
the acknowledgment of foreign rules, see particularly Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120
(KIB. 1775); Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1774). The "shift" to an adjustment
of a case with extraterritorial features according to a foreign rule differing from English common
municipal law as opposed to a general common rule was not a shift in legal theory, but both
really resulted from the inevitable divergence of legal rules among municipal laws, even in the
case of once common or general rules. See Sack, supra note 96, at 349-50, 376-77. Moreover, the
lex loci approach was often consciously evaluated in terms of the traditional common law function of supporting party expectations. For example counsel in the Mostyn case argued as the use
of foreign law: "For it [the action] must be determined by the law of the country, or by the law
of the place where the act was done. If by our law it would be the highest injustice, by making a
man who has regulated his conduct by one law, amenable to another totally opposite." Id. at
1024.

Indeed, the way in which Professor Horwitz creates the impression of novelty by assigning
new and entirely subjective motives to highly conventional processes is strikingly revealed in his
discussion of the treatment given the law merchant in the American state courts. Horwitz notes
the use of the "struck jury", a practice which he asserts is a manifestation of "mercantile control
over the rules of commercial law", and the eventual decline of the expert merchant jury to enunciate governing rules "under the pretext of fact finding"; HoRwIrz, supra, note 1 at 155, 157.
The eventual decline of the process is seen by Horwitz as representing a growing "pattern of
judicial hostility to competing sources of legal authority," and as such constituting another novel
postrevolutionary trend indicative of the overall transformation of the legal system. Id. at 159.
Actually, Horwitz fails to appreciate how closely this development in America paralleled that
which occurred in England about two centuries earlier, and the fact that this development there
occurred entirely within highly conventional common law processes. The phenomenon which
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of common rules either implicitly or explicitly observed by all concerned
sovereigns to mitigate the inevitable differences in the substantive rules and
their application among different nations and states, was essential to the successful settlement of multistate problems. The form in which a particular
multistate transaction was conducted would in the contemplation of both the
state and federal courts implicate a body of law which no state alone was
constitutionally competent to supply because of the limiting conception of
sovereign authority embodied in private international law rules.
This will, if properly understood, explain why the various state cases were
not thought to be in direct conflict with some obligatory pronouncement
Horwitz characteristically mistakes as revolutionary actually concerned the relative weight to be
assigned to precedent which represented various stages of maturation within the common law
process. The "pattern" was merely one of the typical and gradual judicial acknowledgements of
customary rules in which increasingly dispositive weight was given to these judicial
acknowledgements as they became more precisely "settled," or relatedy extended themselves to
new and different applications of a rule of decision. For example, after a series of internal
changes in which the common law courts began to exercise jurisdiction within England over cases
technically arising within counties other than that in which suit was laid, the courts in the early
seventeenth century extended their jurisdiction to cases wherein a truly internationalas opposed
to intranationalchoice of law question might arise. In so doing, the courts began a long process
by which common, international customary rules were incorporated into the common law by
treating their existence initially as fact questions, and later as legal or precedential matters. See
Sack, supra note 96, at 342. As Sack describes the process
[Tihe common law courts appear to have treated the law merchant not as a law but as
a custom. The rules of the law merchant had to be pleaded specially, and proved,
each time, as a fact.
... The rules of that law gradually ceased to be treated as questions of fact. In
1699, Judge Treby declared, with reference to bills of exchange, that there no longer
was any need to allege and prove the custom.
And so gradually, the law merchant became 'part of the Common law.' Id., at 376-77. For cases
illustrating the movement toward the recognition of positive rules of the lex mercatoria in the
common law process, see Martin v. Boure, 79 Eng. Rep. 6 (K.B. 1603) (first common law case
dealing with a foreign bill of exchange), Pierson v. Pounteys, 80 Eng. Rep. 91 (K.B. 1609).
Vanheath v. Turner, 124 Eng. Rep. 20 (C.P. 1621), Magadara v. Hoit, 89 Eng. Rep. 597 (K.B.
1691), Bromwich v. Lloyd, 125 Eng. Rep. 870 (C.P. 1699).
As the various exegesis of the common lex mercatoria became "municipalized" local variations were treated the same way internal variations in the English common law system had initially been treated-as factual questions which were addressed by reference to a common choice of
law rule. The function of the choice of law rule was the same as the initial general law rule, and
was incorporated into the initial "fact-finding" stage of the common law process in the same
manner as the general law. The conflict or choice of law rule ultimately developed a very efficient interplay with the general law rules themselves in the American federal system, a fact largely ignored by our legal scholars. See generally Sack, supra note 96. The old "natural law" theory
thus neither commanded absolute uniformity in the rule content of positive law, nor any particular method of addressing deviations from identical rules.
If the judges' "unwillingness any longer to recognize competing lawmakers" is a product of
an increasingly instrumental "vision of law" as Horwitz claims, it is an "instrumental vision"
established in our "received" common law system almost synchronous with the initial settlement
of our country. A "continuation" rather than a "transformation" thus apty describes such
precedential development in post-revolutionary America-at least in terms of basic common law
processes-whether or not what was being done is labelled as "instrumental." If all that is being
said is that we inherited and "instrumental vision" of law, then the most that can be said of Horwitz's research is that, like many before him, he has "discovered" the common law.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:449

about the correct rule of general commercial law by a federal diversity court
and why most state decisions were not in any case obligatory on the federal
diversity courts. Professor Horwitz's "Federal Court v. Local Rule" metaphor
is, it will be observed, entirely inaccurate.10 1 To fully understand the litigation in the early federal cases, it must be understood that the ability to
discern in advance which body of rules and usages would be deemed relevant
to a trasaction was the key to understanding the early commercial decisions.
It was here that a decisional technique, which was the legacy of a customary
system attentive to autonomous part behavior, was felt the strongest. Most
importantly the mature system of mercantile law and the mechanisms for
selecting and acting according to given sets fo particular or general usages
was evident not only to parties, but to courts, and was critical in assessing the
degree to which any particular judicial decision could be though to represent
the pretensions of a sovereign to exclusive dominion over an issue, as opposed
to an interpretation of extraterritorial, general law.
" This was largely possible because the commercial law had in many
areas-for example, negotiable paper-assumed a certain generally recognized formality through the dealings of private parties. As one writer decribed
the character of commercial practices relating to negotiable paper, "The
rules of law on the subject of negotiable paper are more exact and technical
than those of any other department of Mercantile Law. ;"104 The certainty of
the rules meant certainty of consequences through the use of particular forms
prescribed by international custom. It was through the use of these forms of
commercial dealing that it was made evident to parties and to courts that the
backdrop of usage, so important in fulfilling the aims sough by the parties,
would at times be usages among states, and common to many, rather than
peculiar to any one of them. The use of these forms, or failure to do so,
would in many cases be a clear indicator of which sort of customs-municipal
or local, as opposed to extraterritorial-would be applicable to the transaction. It is of utmost significance that both the federal and state courts would
identify the appropriate or governing precedent according to the formalities
of the transaction, and judge the consequences to the litigants according to
whichever body of rules their behavior had implicated-extraterritorial or intraterritorial ones. Did an agruably relevant state precedent purport to be (or
not to be) in accordance with extraterritorial rules, as opposed to local ones?
That was a question. The answer to it dictated the body of case law with
which the state case was to be compared.
The value of a judicial decision as precedent in extraterritorial cases was
determined with reference to a wider field of data and by different standards
than was the case with purely municipal rules, and this was so without affec'See Horwitz's characterization of the conflict of laws rules in HoRwrrz, TRANSFORMATION,
supra note, at 246, and the discussion of MANDEVILLE at notes 57-61 supra & text accompanying.

104T.

PARSONS, LAWS OF BUSINESS FOR ALL THE STATES OF THE UNION, WITH FORMS AND DIREc-

TIONS FOR ALL TRANSACTIONS 156 (1869).
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ting any considerations of federalism whatsoever. It is enough for our present
purpose to note the implication of prevailing extraterritorial custom through
the use of well understood transactional forms and the role this played in
judicial settlement of private disputes. Quite naturally the federal court sitting in a diversity case which per se involved some multistate elements (and
usually in the commercial law cases actually involved an interstate or
multistate transaction) would have to determine what the appropriate source
of the governing rule was, and by adverting to the presumptively applicable
multi-state rules of a customary origin in such cases should not be confused
with a pretension to "make" the governing law by blatantly ignoring a local
state rule. Further, in deciding controversies within the context of this
mulitstate customary system, state judges would thus resort to extraterritorial
considerations, and in so doing they did not manifest the act of a sovereign
"freezing" a rule within its geographical power to do so, but rather acted in a
cooperative fashion in an area over which they could not pretend absolute
authority. The originally non-sovereign origin of commercial rules in the
common law process, of course, accounts for the fact that judicial opinions
were not referred to as laws but only as evidence of the law, and this
aphorism was even more apt in the state cases admittedly dealing with transactions over which the state involved could not pretend any absolute authority, that is in cases involving extraterritorial or multistate rules. Thus, if a
large portion of the common law rules involved "interstate common law,"
then federal judicial exegesis of the principles contained in these rules posed
no direct conflict with state sovereignty at all. And more to the point, such
cases cannot be construed as examples of judicial creativity in conflict with
presumptively applicable state rules, because under such an interpretation the
conflict is absent. At least no more of a conflict or deviation from state case
law would be represented than is present in the ordinary common law process
of construing precedent which takes place within the state. The ultimate
results in applying the general rules may vary from court to court as may opinions about their true content, but this of course proves nothing about any
novel or instrumental variety of judicial power.
Under this view of the commercial law as originally customary law, and
as subject to the common law process, the nature of diversity jurisdiction in
commercial cases should be apparent. In a customary law system in which the
purpose of a grant of subject matter jurisdiction is to protect nonresidents
form local bias, it would be essential that the intentions and expectations of
the parties to every dispute be determined by a tribunal independent of the
apprehended local prejudice. The law applied would be determined by the
exercise of independent judgment by the impartial tribunal, just as factual
disputes between the parties would be resolved by a presumptively unbiased
trier of fact. Neither function, law determining or fact finding, would be
dispensable to the achievement of the jurisdictional objectives. Indeed,
abrogation of the law determining function in a customary law system .would
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have certainly defeated the purposes of the jurisdictional grant, since by
hypothesis law was being created or adopted not by a particular sovereign,
but by the private actions of the parties over a long course of time. Thus,
failure of the federal courts to exercise independent judgment on the controlling elements of law in commercial cases would have violated the doctrine of
separation of powers, because it would have involved a disregard by them of
the congressional command embodied in the diversity jurisdiction to provide
impartial justice in disputes between citizens of different states.
For example, in the Mandeville case, the basic problem was defining the
content of the multistate or extraterritorial rule to which the parties adverted
by using a particular transactional form-a note. The rule content on the
particular legal issue involved- the negotiability of a promissory note-was a
matter of much debate. The duty to follow the rule once identified was not
debatable however, nor was the effect of an attempted localization of the
legal rule in a manner contrary to the limitations on state sovereignty provided by the conflict of laws rules, that is by the interstate common law.105
In viewing the federal case law of the early nineteenth century as a
whole, it is striking to observe how the general conceptions of sovereign
authority -particularly rules of private international law-correlated with
judicial choice of relevant precedent. The common law process in both the
federal and state courts evolved a set of commonly accepted general rules
which dictated when the courts of any particular sovereign would be looked
to as authority. The inventiveness or instrumental character of any given
judicial decision would have to be assessed against the background of precedent that all courts concerned would have regarded as relevant. The interaction of the substantive rules and the conflict rules dictated to the common
law courts which precedents were relevant. Unless the cases from the state
where a diversity court happened to be sitting were automatically accepted as
authoritative, then federal cases appearing to depart from them are not germane to the degree of judicial discretion being exercised. That is, if the state
cases themselves are addressed to subjects or situations over which the state
has no absolute authority, then the body of judicial data which other courts,
including federal ones, may evaluate to resolve a dispute is not confined to
the state cases. Departure from a state precedent under this assumption thus
may be nothing more than a departure from any precedent which inaccurately states the rule revealed as the whole body of relevant cases. Once the question of federal v. state sovereignty drops out, all that remains are federal and
state cases which must be viewed collectively as part of the common law process shared by both federal and state courts, rather than as clashing exponents of "local v. instrumental" law. The degree to which the common law
process was amenable to the incorporation of rules of private international
10 1R.
(1977).

BRIDWELL & R. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW 175, n.79
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law by which both the state and federal courts would measure the correlative
position of the states as sources of law for multistate disputes, and the resultant degree -to which judges conceived of such rules as a part of the common
law process is therefore crucial to the "instrumental" thesis. This is so because
it is critical to the presumed applicability of the state precedent where the
federal court happened to be sitting. The resolution of this question will
destroy the impression of tension existing exclusively between the federal and
the state common law rules from the state wherein the federal court sits,
which is so critical to the Horwitz thesis. For it is true that the integration of
private international law rules into the English common law system had proceeded apace for over a century before the American Revolution, and continued in both the American federal and state courts thereafter. 06
In summary, the Horwitz thesis proceeds from an artifically narrowed
conception of the common law process, based on evidence taken from the
larger context. This conception is transferred to the American federal system
without any analysis of the subtle but observable constitutional and jurisdictional changes which the system entailed. Federal and state cases are thus
equally subject to the over-simplifying transformation dialectic, with the
result that federal cases are judged against the background of a narrow pool
of case authority which Horwitz regards as exclusively applicable-the state
cases where the federal courts are sitting. Thus any arguable departure from
those cases is taken as more evidence of the new instrumentalism.
If one accepts the foregoing hypothesis about a more complex system of
rules governing sovereignty having been integrated into the common law
system, however, the pool of authority relevant to the federal court would include other state cases as well as federal cases in situations involving matters
beyond the exclusive authority of any one state, and yet not committed to
federal authority. The "rule construction" function alone would thus account
for an apparent departure from the state cases from the state in which the
federal court sat, simply because the pool of relevant case data is ex hypothesi
much larger than just the cases of that state.
C. Conflict of Laws and Interstate Common Law
It is clear that the conflict of laws scheme in private international law
was integrated into the common law process in the federal courts in order to
accommodate the operation of the local laws of the coequal states and to insure the necessary protection, under the diversity jurisdiction, of the expectations of noncitizens and foreigners.' 0 1 The diversity jurisdiction operating
under the merely declaratory injunction of the Rules of Decision Act was
'"Sack, supra note 96, at 376.
'See Brown v. Van Braam, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 344 (1797). Compare Warren, New Light on
the History of the FederalJudiciary Act of 1780, 37 HARv. L. REV. 49, 88 n.84 (1923), and
Crosskey, supra note, at 822-24.
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naturally not taken by the federal courts to require unconditional obedience
to local laws (a presumption essential to create the illusion of contrast in Horwitz's use of the apparently deviant federal case law to prove the "instrumental
thesis). Rather, the coequal sovereign status of the states in a federal system
made apparent "some limitation on the operation" of the Rules of Decision
Act's directive, and it was a limitation which arose "whenever the subject
matter of the suit is extraterritiorial. ' 0 8 To have blindly imitated local rules
would "clearly defeat nearly all objects for which the Constitution has provided a national court." 109
The application of the Rules of Decision Act in accordance with private
internatibnal law conflict of laws principles is in fact the quite logical outcome of the transfer of the conventional common law approach to the federal
system. Viewed in this light, the activities of the federal courts during the
early nineteenth century appear as quite a conventional adaptation of the
jurisprudential and decisional norms of English law to the American federal
system. Clearly Swift v. Tyson,110 long the controversial symbol of illegitimate
judicial creativeness, cannot be adequately explained by Horwitz's oversimplified and crude "discovery" or "natural law" model. Though the decisions of the New York courts were unsettled on the basic point of law involved in Swift,"' Justice Story assumed arguendo that they were settled and
rested his decision upon the non-obigatory nature of the local decisions under
the facts of the case.11 2 Story's initial explanation for this is essential to an
understanding of what was going on in Swift. He stated: "It is observable that
the Courts of New York do not found their decisions upon this point upon
any local statute, or positive, fixed, or ancient local usage: but they deduce
the doctrine from the general principles of commercial law."113 In other
"'sVan Reimsdyk v. Kane, 28 F. Cas. 1062 (C.C.D.R.I. 1812) (No. 16871), at 1065, rev'd on
other grounds sub nor. Clark v. Van Reinsdyk, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 53 (1815).
It has long been recognized that implicit limitations on the sovereign authority of coequal
states were judicially enforceable by the federal courts, even when a judgment of a state court
was involved. The Law of Nations then played a role as an implicit element in the Supreme
Courts view of the full faith and credit clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, and a fortiori played a
large role in their view of the extraterritorial effect of state laws. See Rheinstein, The Constitutional Basis of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 791-96, 802 (1955). Compare Nussbaum,
Rise and Decline of the Law of Nations Doctrine in Conflict of Laws, 42 U. COLO. L. REv. 189
(1942).
"'9Van Reimsdyk v. Kane, 28 F. Cas. 1062, 1065 (C.C.D.R.I. 1812) (No. 16871).
11041 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Swift v. Tyson involved the legal issue of whether or not a
preexisting debt was valuable consideration for a negotiable instrument, and thus sufficient to
give the holder immunity from defenses existing between the endorser and the obligor. Since it
was a diversity case, the question of which body of rules could be used to answer this question
naturally arose. Justice Story's opinion in Swift, declining to be bound by the judicial opinions of
the New York courts, has been characteristically interpreted by Horwitz as an "instrumental" attempt to impose procommercial national legal rules, invented by the federal judges, upon unwilling state judges. HoRwrTz, supra note, at 245-52. This essay presents a different view.
"'41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 16-18.
112Id. at 18-19.
1"Id. at 18. See also Gloucester Ins. Co. v. Younger, 10 F. Cas. 495, 500-01 (C.C.D. Mass.
1855) (No. 5, 487).
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words, there had been no "localization" of the rule of commercial law involved since the Courts of New York themselves purported to follow the general
commercial law, not to deviate from it by establishing a rule derived from
some "positive, fixed, or ancient local usage." Once the importance of this
fact is understood as to Swift and all similar cases within the ambit of the
general commercial law, the justification for the federal courts making an independent judgment about the applicable rule of law becomes clear. Appreciating the significance of this fact within the context of the unique
jurisdictional and constitutional status of the federal courts and within the
context of the commercial and conflict rules relevant to that unique status, is
absolutely essential to reading the real meaning of Swift and similar cases.
It also becomes clear why § 34 of the Judiciary Act did not bind the federal
court to follow state courts decisions in general comercial cases-i.e. why
11 4
state decisions were not "laws," but only "evidence of . . . laws,"
When the state courts of a particular state themselves purport to follow
the general commercial law in particular cases, they create a set of expectations on the part of nonresidents who deal with the citizens of that state. The
expectations are that the general customs of the commercial world will
operate to control transactions entered into with citizens of the state, or
within the state, and the nonresidents can act accordingly in their dealings by
ignoring the possibility that their transactions will be controlled by some
other rules. This does not, of course, mean that the subjective state of mind
of the nonresident will be examined to determine whether he was aware of
local deviations from the general commercial practice in a given locality.
Rather, it means that when a state encourages its citizens to act in accordance
with stereotyped general commercial practice, rather than formally localizing
a practice by statute, or by explicit recognition in a judicial decision that the
state in given transactions is not following general commercial law, it creates
expectations on the part of outsiders that those stereotyped forms mean the
same thing in the state that they mean everywhere else. If, therefore, a noncitizen relies on these implicit representations in his dealings with residents of
a state, and if the state subsequently applies a rule to the dealings which
deviates from the general practice, the expectations of the noncitizen have
been defeated. He has, in short, been misled by the state's apparent approval
of general commercial law.
Just as the common law courts characteristically had to determine which
universe of general or particular customs and positive rules derived from
customs a particular transaction implicated, so the federal courts in performing their decisional function would pursue the inquiry into the content of the
governing rule in the same manner as the state courts, that is to discern ,the
content and application of the correct general, extraterritorial rule. In this
sense, and not in some vague "discovery" sense the federal courts were perfor4

1

Swift

v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
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ming a "like function" as the state courts. The necessity for both sets of
courts to engage in the exegesis of extraterritorial rules was the product of the
fact that, unlike England, the United States was not a unitary system wherein
judicial enforcement (as opposed to promulgation) of common law rules
could proceed unaffected by the limitations on the general legal authority of
coequal sovereigns.
If one asks the question, what would one expect to happen under the
adaptation of conventional common law judicial techniques in dealing with
the consequences of federalism, what actually happened makes a good deal
more sense, and the novelty thesis of the current revisionists such as Horwitz
suffer by being thus placed in an historical context they would rather ignore.
Consequently, the federal court, to protect the expectations of the noncitizen,
had to make its own independent judgment about the general commercial
principles, rather than relying on the decisions of any given state, since those
decisions were only "evidence" of what the general commercial practice was,
rather than "law."
In the above example reference to the fact that the "maker used terms of
negotiability in his contract" is an implicit reference to a set of principles
which would give the words chosen that effect. In describing the parties'
choice of form in just this way, the primary significance of the acknowledgment of such principles by the parties and the fact that the principles
transcended state boundaries and thus state sovereign authority is made clear.
Otherwise such words should not have the capability of "binding him [the
maker] to the endorsee" at all if they would not have that effect under the
law of the place where the note was made. The predictable implication of
general customary rules from the use of particular transactional forms is thus
perhaps the most consistent feature in the analysis of these multistate problems, and is the key to understanding the authority of judicial decisions about
them.
Swift v. Tyson itself is a prime example of how the diversity jurisdiction
operated to preserve the intentions and expectations of the parties when their
dealings had taken place against the assumed background of general commercial practice.115 Thus everything practical encouraged states to leave
general commercial custom intact as they found it, rather than to attempt to
"localize" general rules of commerce in accordance with some supposed state
policy. It is the conformity of such commercial law opinions as Swift v. Tyson
to an extremely broad international constituency, and the support found for
such decisions in the customary paractices of innumerable private parties pur'It is difficult to imagine any real expectations Mr. Tyson might have had being defeated
by the Swift decision. He employed an instrument clearly subject to negotiation in foreign states,
or to persons therein, according to usages or rules generally observed. It is interesting to note the
reliance on party expectations in many of the more modem discussions of conflict of laws. See A.
Shapira, 'GraspAll-Loose All': On Restraint and Moderation in the Reformulation of Choice of
Law Policy, 77 CoL. L. REv. 248, 265-68 (1977).
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suing their own autonomous commercial dealings, that best illustrates the fictional quality of "instrumentalist" views of judicial decision making as a
distinctly early nineteenth century phenomenon. Such a characterization
merely shifts the description of a perfectly traditional judicial function from
the gradual recognition of widely held and objectively provable practices to a
subjective evaluation of judicial behavior. This creates the impression that
something quite ordinary is in fact new.
It seems illogical to assert the supposed novelty of "instrumentalism" in
judicial activity, the engineering of social and economic policy according to
judicial perceptions, when in fact the supposedly instrumentalist decisions
reflect the views and practices of the majority of the commercial world.
Historically speaking, cause and effect are thus reversed, and the judicial role
is described as one of creating rather than recognizing. We may of course admit to a degree of discretion in employing the processes of reasoning and
analogy in the common law decisional process, but the question which
plagues historians of the period concerns the basic assumptions from which
judicial decision making begins. For if, as appears to be the case, the proponents of instrumentalism and their interpreters base their opinion that
judges came in the early nineteenth century to "view their role" as lending
support to economic maximization by departure from precedent or upon
some other novelty in the judicial opinions, their proof seems to fail."' As has
already been shown, departure from precedent does not necessarily signify
any change at all in the judicial view of the source of law, and the highly
traditional nature of opinions now viewed as examples of judicial inventiveness seems to undermine the basic theory. The insistence in viewing
judicial activity in purely positivistic terms has created the impression of conflict and novelty where none existed in fact. The subtle aspects of the decisional process have been conveniently characterized from time to time as
"glittering generalities."
The current acquiescence to a positivistic legislative model in analyzing
judicial activity has created a distorted impression of the legal history of the
early national period. Deviations from precedent or the articulated purposes
of an announced rule in early cases have been viewed by the standards of expediency and convenience thought to be relevant to the wise legislator, and
the notion that judicial pronouncements were in fact reactions to a universe
of changing customary practices and expectations has been discounted. The
"invisible hand" has become a favorite target of critics anxious to explode the
notion that legitimate philosphical and practical differences separated the
judges and the legislator. Judicial as opposed to legislative function is a "fiction which "nobody believes." 11 7 However, the starting point for the judicial
11'See generally Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient? 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).

117See Stimson & Smith, State Statute and Common Law, 2 POLITICAL SCI. Q. 105, 106

(1887).
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function and its necessarily limited interference with the vast bulk of human
activity which typifies the early nineteenth century case law, particularly in
the admittedly significant commercial law area, indicates that the "innovative" judicial work was accomplished without a revolution in the theory
of legal obligation. It is, moreover, the breadth of the constituency supporting the rules of private commercial law which makes the characterization of
judicial activity in this area questionable. The social intercourse which produced the mature lex mercatoria is grossly simplified by the positivistic
model. In fact, early commentators explicitly recognized the diffuse source of
the rules of law and the resultant relative inability to mold them according to
economic or class preferences." 8
The nonpreemptive character of federal decisions on local matters, and
the general acknowledgment of "like function" performed by both state and
federal courts in extraterritorial matters,119 all dispel the specter of powerful
federal intervention of an "instrumental sort." The utterance of the sovereign
was simply not regarded as being quite as important in resolving private matters as it is today.
CONCLUSION

Ironically, it is the "common law context," the common law system,
which more than anything else Horwitz seeks to illuminate while it is that
feature of Anglo-American legal history he has apparently explored the least.
The use of suggestive intellectual constructs such as "the will theory" of law
and various bits of evidence taken out of context as suggestive of some novel
conception, such as the "consensual" descriptions of the common law process,
reveal one of the greatest apparent weaknesses of our current so-called
"intellectual history." Precisely, the "intellectual" developments sought to be
proved actually are the a prioi assertion with which the author begins rather

See Holt; Now and Then: The Uncertain State of Nineteenth Century American Legal
History, 7 IND. L. Rxv. 615 (1974). The author notes the process by which these sweeping
theories such as instrumentalism are based upon slight evidence.
"Horwitz's support for his views seems somewhat weak and will require some sublaternal
monographic aid, but the thesis is convincing." Id. mat 632. However it is quite possible that the
emphasis upon the positivistic creative, legislative model in analyzing early case law causes the
significance of isolated and slight evidence to be overstated. The case law must be evaluated in
whole units-for example private commercial law adjudications in specific courts or jurisdictions.
"OSee 1 I. PARSONS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SHIPPING AND THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ADMIRALTY 4-5 (1869), where Parsons notes that commercial law rules, being "founded as they were
upon the necessities, and the usages of the merchants generally" are by their general acceptance
in an extensive commercial community are "seldom, if ever, materially affected by the rights and
prejudices of caste or class." Indeed, one interpretive theme which seems to divide legal historians
is the question of whether or not judicial action in America has taken place within a broad social
consensus. Contrary to Horwitz' view, James Willard Hurst has consistently emphasi±ed broad
popular support for legal change in America. See J. HuRsT, LAW AND SOCIAL OORnItR IN THE
UNITED STATES 226 (1977). My own view of the period is more in agreement with Hurst.
11
'Atkinson v. Brooks, 26 Vt. 569, 582 (1854).
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than demonstrates. "Intellectual history" of the sort necessarily employs arbitrarily selected evidence judged by its superficial conformity to a "theme"
rather than its relationship to elements in a real context. Forgetting the injunctions of many past analysts of legal theory, 120 extrapolations from
evidence selected for its compatability with a preconceived theme obscure
what people to any given time actually thought. A disembodied chain of extrapolations emerges which in reality is only consistent with itself, and the
real devotees of the preconceived theme are hardly ever worried about the
fact that adherence to it requires us to believe that the characters whose
thoughts we seek to know often to constantly vascillate in their most basic
ideas."'
In short, almost everything is measured by these gross extrapolations from
incomplete data-such as Horwitz's fantastical explanation of the use of conflict of laws principles as a repudiation of natural law's one "true rule," making this subject area convincing evidence of the changed theory of law. The
point is that "conceptual" assertions with no regard at all for the legal context in which the evidence occurred appear to be insufficient as a basis for
"intellectual history." This legal context is in reality as important an ingredient as the construction of our intellectual, legal part as any other data. It is
as if Professor Horwitz sought to carefully exclude from consideration the
holdings of all the case data he analyzed, and rely exclusively on dicta. But
the conceptions and rules of construction which shaped the meaning of
judicial pronouncements were (and are) themselves an important part of the
historical and intellectual context of the data used. The overall pattern of the
case law and the structured meaning which the cases collectively had for
lawyers and jurists simply will not permit the use of apparent deviations in
outcome among cases plus selective dicta to successfully carry off the
"transformation" thesis.
The intellectual apparatus which lawyers then employed to illustrate the
conformity of superficial outcome differences with consistent general principles strongly suggests that the meaning Professor Horwitz ascribes to their
actions its false. Not only would the application of some quite familar techniques for analysis of legal data enable Professor Horwitz to derive a more
1

10"To lurk under shifting ambiguities and equivocations in matters of principal weight is

childish." R. Hooker, The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polit, Bk. VIII, ch. 1, § 2 p.
WORKS OF RICHARD HOOKER,
1 1

J. Kemble, ed (

in

THE

).

2 Practically everyone in Professor Horwitz's scenario changes his mind incessantly. Chief
Justice Marshall regularly has "radical shifts" in his understanding of basic legal questions, HORwrTz, supra note 1, at 223, and Justice Story "sharply opposes" his own recently held views with
regularity. Id. at 248-49. While theories of law appear, vanish and then reappear like some
ghostly shade. See id. at 196, where the "theory of preexisting custom" having died,
rematerializes briefly and then vanished again (or does it?). This passage is particularly worth a
second reading. Surely people do change their minds, and ideas come and go, but certainly one
would think that a chosen theme which converts the mass of evidence about our legal past into
such a chaos would be at least initially scrutinized in light of explanations which would accord
some of the principal characters at least a degree of consistency.
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defensible and more accurate meaning from it, but to do so would have illuminated the milieu of our early law according to intellectual techniques
which those living then employed. But serious analysis of intellectual change
in legal history has come to repudiate its less fashionable intellectual apparatus, with at least the lay reading public probably none the wiser. A simple consideration of implicit principles common to a wide variety of case data
would have disclosed certain general consistent "theories" in the case law
itself, which would in turn explain what specifically appears to be "transformation." Selective use of outcome differences plus dicta in the case data
hardly measures up to the traditional composite analysis and search for
underlying "thematic" principles common to the lawyer's art.
Such books are of course written for people, perhaps by people, who
already fervently believe what they seek to prove. Thus, the "intellectual
history" at its apparent finest ironically turns out to be the most unmitigated
form of "consensus history," an even more formidable and counter productive
variety than the "old" consensus history because it relies more on the a priori
structure of its arguments and initial preconceptions and less on empiricism,
which is easier to deal with analytically and therefore more to be avoided in
this new "intellectual history." The postulation of these intellectual constructs
has a way of becoming an effective substitute for serious inquiry into intellectual change. The inefficacy and weakness of the new potent revisionist genre
are, however, better concealed than former purely doctrinaire methodology,
because it effectively assumes all the popularized hallmarks and trappings of
respectability, replete with declaration after declaration that what is being
revealed is "consciousness" and other "emerging" things. An abstract litany of
soothing, comforting, largely apparitional theorems with a false though convincing appearance of novelty emerges, and this in turn lulls us into an increasingly comfortable indifference to naive assumptions that the contemporaries of the eighteenth century really meant what they said, and knew
themselves as well as we know them. In fact, a sort of protective coloration
asserts itself, an effective scholastic camouflage, whereby the more empirical
and evidence-oriented writing can be rejected as a sort of "advocate's brief,"
and crabbed "arid formalism," as having too much "detail" and not enough
proof. Amazingly, some who opt for the broader themes without proof, or
with half-proof, acknowledge the lack of support for such thesis as those of
Horwitz, but find that the "thesis is convincing" anyway. 122 How we are to be
convinced without proof is hard to say. Perhaps half-proof of correctness is
though to equal proof of half-correctness, so that the proponents of thesis
without proof assume the thematic writers such as Horwitz must be at least
half right in what they say.
Likewise by contrast, the more conventional empiricism, which in the
unlikely event it appears at all in the face of unchallenged orthodoxy, ap2
12 See

Holt, Now and Then: The Uncertain State of Nineteenth Century American Legal
History 7 IND. L. REv. 615, 639 (1974); L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 1-7 (1973).
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pears more and more to be really "not with it." A general plea has been
made for a good deal less of the "lawyer's detail" and for more emphasis on
broader interpretive themes, and surely what this represents is on the whole
good. But, on the other hand, hopefully this essay has at least provided a
plausible argument for some close scrutiny of the work product that purports
to satisfy this demand, and has provided some evidence of the dangers of the
popular aversion for the "adversaries' brief" or the art of "narrowing cases to
fit their facts." As Frederick Maitland observed, lawyers usually don't make
good historians, but to be a good legal histroian, being a lawyer helps, and
the classical function of lawyers plays a large part-albeit a technical and
often forbidding part-of understanding our legal past with any degree of accuracy."2 ' The ascent to the ambitious observation of broad themes runs the
strong risk of loosing a precise and indispensable knowledge of the various important strands in the whole theme, and the rush to turn a beacon on the
whole of the law and its fundamental meaning may shed more light on the
observer than on the subject.
Admittedly, phenomena such as "judicial discretion" are not easily quantified. The relationship between extant precedent, judicial discretion and
precedential change resulting from a mixture of these two common law
elements is difficult to define precisely. The ability of a prevalent decisional
technique to accomplish extensive and profound doctrinal change and still remain the same technique or constitutional common law process is an exceedingly complex phenomenon to understand, as is the point at which
thoroughgoing precedential change is a fact attributable to a wholly new conception rather than being an extension of the old. Horwitz's book adds little to
our understanding of this process, and at most presents largely unsupported
conclusions with a mere description of doctrinal change, sometimes stated inaccurately.
This is apparently a rather critical stage in the research and writing of
American legal history. This book and similar ones illustrate one of the more
serious problems in this critical phase. Particularly, the promising and
necessary emphasis on theme is quite likely to turn out to be a set of blinders,
rather than enlarging our vision as it should. Once the blinders are removed
and our vision is in fact expanded, the original theme which the blinders produced quickly evaporates. The delicate construction of the evidence outside of
any extended context and the weakness of the arguments when the context is
supplied indicates that this praticular book, like any overly doctrinaire approach to a complex subject, actually superimposes the final result on artifically constructed evidence, rather than developing it from the historical
data. Even more interesting is the intellectual process which may employed to
undermine Professor Horwitz's transformation theme at almost every turn, for
11

3F. Maitland, Why the History of English Law Was Never Written, in FREDERICK WILLIAM

MArrLAND, HISTORIAN 132, 140 (R. Schuyler ed. 1960).
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it boils down to one of the more elemental analytical tools of the lawyer: the
comparison of a good deal of data, primarily from case law, in order to
discover if some implicit pattern in the data can illuminate it, and assist in its
whole comprehension. The pattern is, when articulated, a useful model in the
search for the more important, if less overt, fundamental legal processes at
work and is one of the vital intellectual tools employed to expand knowledge
beyond the suggestive impressions conveyed by mere doctrine. In seriously investigating legal change, it must form at least a competing role in the
analytical process. The by-products of the complete separation of thematic or
intellectual history, from the more formal, albeit "arid," process of case
analysis on a vast scale can be most countrproductive, as Horwitz's book
demonstrates. The merging of both federal and state cases, which in fact
represented extremely different constitutional and jurisdictional contexts, and
evolved under different influences and considerations, within the simple
"transformation" dialectic really obscures much that is relevant. We should
then cautiously refrain from the "lawyers formalism v. thematic or intellectual history" dichotomy and thereby better avoid thoroughly confusing either
of the forms with reality, and confusing pretensions of proof in an agreeable
disguise with actual proof. The intellectual apparatus of the profession should
not be the handmaiden of fashion, which seems to be a result more possible
than many of us would like to believe. In short, the "Theme" may be quite
expansive, and the understanding it permits quite narrow.
Naturally it would be a mistake to conclude that the alternative interpretation offered here-of a largely self ordering system supportive of
autonomous individual behavior and experiment, adjusting itself with the aid
of limited judicial intervention that does not effectively elevate the narrow interests of "caste or class"-is a whole or complete picture of reality. As an
historian of science once remarked: "If there is a lesson in our story it is that
the manipulation, according to strictly self-consistent rules, of a set of symbols representing one single aspect of the phenomena may produce correct,
verifiable predictions, and yet completely ignore all other aspects whose
ensemble constitutes reality."12 4 But the doctrinaire insistence on a narrow
"strictly self-consistent" theme hides the richness of the whole ensemble with
its widely varied judicial personalities, complex and various jurisdictional and
constitutional considerations, and astonishingly diversified array of private interests (many of which respond to their legal environment without leaving any
litigational record). It states a claim for law upon life which is, I think, a bit
overstated and too self-important, and is a theme which inverts the position
of the individual vz a vis the law as it was understood during the early national period, at least as I read it. The emphasis upon a simple theme which
calls our attention to this richness and complexity, if only by burying it under
a doctrinaire plot, may be Horwitz's greatest service to our understanding of
Amercian legal history, and for this he should certainly be praised.
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